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The Anonymity Heuristic:  How
Surnames Stop Identifying People
When They Become Trademarks
Russell Jacobs
ABSTRACT
This Article explores the following question central to trade-
mark law:  if a homograph has both a surname and a trademark
interpretation will consumers consider those interpretations as
intrinsically overlapping or the surname and trademark as com-
pletely separate and unrelated words?  While trademark jurispru-
dence typically has approached this question from a legal
perspective or with assumptions about consumer behavior, this
Article builds on the Law and Behavioral Science approach to
legal scholarship by drawing from the fields of psychology, lin-
guistics, economics, anthropology, sociology, and marketing.
The Article concludes that consumers will regard the two in-
terpretations as separate and unrelated, processing surname
trademarks through an anonymity heuristic comprised of two ele-
ments.  First, consumers understand that the trademark signals
the unknown source of the goods or services bearing the trade-
mark.  Second, consumers do not equate the trademark with a
particular individual bearing that name or believe that someone
with that name offers the goods or services.  Contrary to the
traditional characterization of surname trademarks as merely de-
scriptive marks, the research into human behavior suggests that
they fit better in the category of arbitrary marks.
Five key findings support the anonymity heuristic and the
characterization of surname trademarks as arbitrary marks:  (1)
people process words to resolve ambiguity; (2) people process
surnames differently than other words; (3) people process trade-
marks differently than other words; (4) consumers understand
trademarks within a cultural framework; and (5) people process
surnames and trademarks through separate nodes.
Frequency and uniqueness will impact the anonymity heuris-
tic in two ways.  First, for infrequently purchased goods, consum-
ers will develop a weaker trademark node and the surname node
for the related homograph may compete with that the trademark
319
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node.  Second, if a famous person or a personally known service
provider with an uncommon surname uses that surname as a
trademark, consumers may associate that trademark directly with
that person, interrupting the anonymity heuristic.
Based on the learnings from the multi-disciplinary literature,
the Article recommends removing the statutory bar to trademark
registration of terms deemed primarily merely surnames.  In-
stead, a new own-name defense can supplement the existing
prohibitions against deceptive trademarks to promote honest use
of surnames as trademarks.
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INTRODUCTION
We constantly decipher the role of words even though we
rarely, if ever, notice when and how we process language.  For ex-
ample, we do not give up in frustration when we have to disambig-
uate various functions of homographs in order to figure out which
usage of the word makes sense in the particular context.  Multi-dis-
ciplinary scholarship continues to uncover greater understanding
into the way we process language, and in particular how we identify
the correct function of a homograph.  This literature may disrupt
assumptions underlying trademark law, an area of law that focuses
on how consumers interpret words.  The way consumers treat ho-
mographs raises interesting lines of inquiry across multiple topics in
trademark law, but this Article focuses on a single question relating
to surname trademarks: if a homograph has both a surname and a
trademark interpretation, will consumers consider those interpreta-
tions as intrinsically overlapping or the surname and trademark as
completely separate and unrelated words?
Real-world applications of this question come up in the deci-
sions of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) on whether to register trademarks.  For example, the
agency’s trademark administrative review body—the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”)—recently affirmed refusals to
register the marks PARSONS for golf equipment under § 2(e)(4) of
the Lanham Act as primarily merely a surname.1  The TTAB re-
jected the trademark applicant’s argument that consumers would
find the non-surname significance of the word “parsons” (i.e., Prot-
estant clergy) more familiar than the surname significance because
the goods and services did not relate to the clergy.2  The mark in
question comprised a homograph that could signal, inter alia, a
town in southeast Kansas,3 an actor from the popular sitcom The
Big Bang Theory,4 the design school in Greenwich Village,5 a Prot-
estant minister,6 or that trademark.7  One string of seven letters
1. In re Parsons Xtreme Golf, LLC, Ser. Nos. 86666031, 86700421, 86701458,
86701787, 86702680, and 86706223, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 471 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 17,
2018) (non-precedential).
2. Id. at *11-12
3. PARSONS KANSAS. https://bit.ly/2nfYY8n [https://perma.cc/PD8Q-GWAN]
(last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
4. Jim Parsons, WIKIPEDIA, https://bit.ly/28STtF4 [https://perma.cc/D7ZV-
QDXT] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
5. Parsons, THE NEW SCHOOL, https://bit.ly/2wMaRqg [https://perma.cc/4T53-
ML2P] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
6. Parson, Merriam-Webster, https://bit.ly/2nfJTDP [https://perma.cc/VP96-
VVHV] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (defining word as “rector” or “clergyman; espe-
cially: a Protestant pastor”); Winter Wonderland, Lyrics, https://bit.ly/2NF0ivN
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yields at least five different interpretations—geographic name,
school name, surname, common noun, trademark for golfing goods.
This set of appeals illustrates but one example of surname trade-
marks; the same issues arise with the words “baker”8 and “bush,”9
and countless others.
This Article explores the ambiguity inherent in these homo-
graphs, asking how consumers will process a homograph that has,
inter alia, a surname interpretation, when consumers encounter the
word presented as a trademark.  Will consumers interpret a homo-
graph that has both a surname and a trademark interpretation (i.e.,
a surname trademark) as a surname, trademark, both, or neither?
Will they believe that the goods or services offered under the sur-
name trademark come from a person bearing that surname?  These
inquiries point to bigger questions about how consumers make de-
cisions, how people process language, and what it means to own a
name.
This Article answers the inquiries about homograph processing
by proposing that consumers assess surname trademarks through
the anonymity heuristic.  The framework of the anonymity heuristic
incorporates two elements.  First, consumers understand that the
trademark signals the unknown source of the goods or services
bearing the trademark.  Second, consumers do not equate the
trademark with a particular individual bearing that name or believe
that someone with that name offers (some associated) goods or ser-
vices.  Under this heuristic, then, consumers read the PARSONS,
[https://perma.cc/F9R4-TT95] (last visited January 18, 2020) (“In the meadow we
can build a snowman; Then pretend he is Parson Brown; He’ll say: ‘Are you mar-
ried’; ‘We’ll say no man.’”).
7. PXG, https://bit.ly/2nZiGpp [https://perma.cc/U73U-8DAE] (last visited
Jan. 31, 2019).
8. The homograph “baker” could refer, inter alia, to a person who bakes per-
son, a person with that surname, or a trademark used in connection with bicycles.
Baker, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://bit.ly/2lPmbOw [https://perma.cc/K75R-
AFC2] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (defining word as “a person who bakes and sells
bread, cakes, or pastry”); Baker (surname), WIKIPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2lGdW78
[https://perma.cc/X3YB-MPCR] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (listing hundreds of
people with the surname “Baker”); BAKER, Registration No. 4,902,411 (registra-
tion for the mark BAKER in connection with “bicycles” held by Brandplug Corp.).
9. The homograph “bush” could refer, inter alia, to a shrub, one of two former
U.S. Presidents with that surname, or a trademark used in connection with cabi-
nets. Bush, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://bit.ly/2nmK1RQ [https://perma.cc/X3YZ-
3YSK] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (defining word as “shrub; especially:  a low
densely branched shrub”); George Bush, WIKIPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2nhX9rG [https:/
/perma.cc/Q78H-8RNQ] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (listing two U.S. Presidents and
others with the name “Bush”); see also BUSH, Registration No. 1,082,564 (regis-
tration for the mark BUSH in connection with “cabinet and shelving units” held by
Bush Industries, Inc.).
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BAKER, and BUSH trademarks as signals that the same unknown
entity has made or authorized all of the goods offered under the
respective marks (the first element), but the trademarks do not
identify someone named “Parsons,” “Baker,” or “Bush” as that
source (the second element).  Consumers may not know that the
PARSONS golf clubs all originate from an entity named Parsons
Xtreme Golf, LLC, but they believe that all of the PARSONS golf
clubs come from the same entity.10  They do not think to ask if a
Ms. or Mr. Parsons runs or founded that company because they rec-
ognize that the homograph functions as a trademark, not a sur-
name, in this context.  The anonymity heuristic rests on research
showing that consumers can disambiguate the surname and trade-
mark interpretations of homographs.  They do not see a surname
trademark and believe that it functions simultaneously as an identi-
fier of a person and of an anonymous source of the goods, but
rather only the latter.  Consumers process “Parsons” the surname
as a word unrelated to PARSONS the trademark.
Narrow circumstances may disrupt the anonymity heuristic.
Consumers will associate the surname trademark with a particular
individual bearing that surname where the consumer personally
knows that individual (such as local accountant) or where the per-
son behind the trademark has both a high degree of fame and a
unique surname.  Further, consumers will have lower trademark
awareness of surname trademarks for goods that they purchase
infrequently.
Rather than examining this topic within the confines of legal
theory, this Article takes a multi-disciplinary approach to consider
consumer behavior and linguistic processing through the fields of
psychology, linguistics, economics, anthropology, sociology, and
marketing.  By taking this approach, the Article seeks to take “due
regard for the relevant decision-making capabilities of the actors in
that specific setting” and contribute to the Law and Behavioral Sci-
ence approach to legal scholarship.11  The multi-disciplinary schol-
arship supports the anonymity heuristic as it indicates that
consumers process surnames and trademarks differently and sepa-
rately from each other, that consumers easily resolve ambiguity
among the multiple possible interpretations of homographs, and
that consumers create separate nodes with unique associations for
10. See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Ser. No. 86/666,031 (filed June 17,
2015) (abandoned).
11. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:  Re-
moving the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1051, 1057–58 (2000).
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each interpretation.  These findings challenge the traditional as-
sumption in trademark theory that surname trademarks constitute a
species of descriptive terms that identify the particular source of
goods or services and instead support a view of surname trade-
marks as arbitrary marks that have no connection to the non-trade-
mark uses of the homograph.
Section II of this Article provides an overview of the law re-
garding registration of surnames as trademarks.  Section III looks at
the distinctiveness of surname trademarks.  Section IV explores the
multi-disciplinary research on how consumers process surnames
and trademarks.  Section V discusses the impact of familiarity and
frequency on recognition of surname trademarks.  Section VI rec-
ommends changes to the law so that it aligns with the realities of
consumer behavior.  Section VII concludes the Article.
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR TRADEMARK REGISTRATION OF
SURNAMES
The Lanham Act12 sets forth the United States statutory
framework for registration of trademarks, which are defined as a
type of intellectual property that identifies the particular source of
goods or services offered under the mark.13  Section 2(e)(4) ad-
dresses surname trademarks, prohibiting trademark registration of
any term deemed “primarily merely a surname”:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distin-
guished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on
the principal register on account of its nature unless it . . . .
(e) [c]onsists of a mark which . . . (4) is primarily merely a
surname . . . .14
The Lanham Act does not prohibit trademark registration for
all surnames, but rather only for terms which the purchasing public
will regard as primarily merely surnames.15  Congress did not want
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2018).
13. See 1 THOMAS J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2.3 (2017) (“A trademark is a compact symbol that conveys infor-
mation about products or services to potential buyers.”).
14. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 2(e)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(4)
(2018).
15. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TRADE-
MARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1211 (Oct. 2017) [hereinafter
TRADEMARK MANUAL] (“The question of whether a mark is primarily merely a
surname depends on the mark’s primary significance to the purchasing public.
Each case must be decided on its own facts, based upon the evidence in the re-
cord.”) (citing Ex parte Rivera Watch Corp., 106 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145, 149 (Dec.
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to prohibit trademark registration of a term solely because “[a] sur-
name was found in a directory to be the name of somebody some-
where.”16  A blanket prohibition against trademark registration of
any homograph that happens to have a surname function would ig-
nore the reality that consumers would recognize a non-surname in-
terpretation for some surname trademarks at least as much as the
surname function (for example, the term “hill”), or that they would
not recognize the term as a surname and thus consider it a coined
term.17  In passing the Lanham Act, Congress considered testimony
that an absolute prohibition “merely limits the field of choice” and
chose instead to prohibit registration only of terms consumers
would consider primarily merely surnames.18
The statutory prohibition in § 2(e)(4) derives from the com-
mon-law tradition that all people have the right to use their own
names in connection with their businesses.19  Recent decisions of
the TTAB have affirmed that this policy reason remains the basis
for § 2(e)(4), noting that “the purpose behind Section 2(e)(4) is to
keep surnames available for people who wish to use their own sur-
names in their businesses.”20  This common-law tradition rests on
assumptions that allowing business owners to identify companies by
Comm’r Pat. 1955))); accord id. § 1211.01(a)(v) (“Regardless of the rarity of the
surname, the test is whether the primary significance of the term to the purchasing
public is that of a surname.”).
16. Rivera, 106 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 149; see also id. at 149 n.3 (discussing the
pertinent legislative history).
17. See, e.g., In re United Distillers, PLC, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1220, 1222
(T.T.A.B. 2000) (non-precedential) (“While the term HACKLER certainly can be
a surname, nonetheless, the word has another significance or meaning.”). Hill,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://bit.ly/2nRDfDZ [https://perma.cc/38NH-3UPM] (last
visited Jan. 31, 2019) (defining word as “a usually rounded natural elevation of
land lower than a mountain”); Hill (surname), WIKIPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2muxICW
[https://perma.cc/J79Q-29BM] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (listing hundreds of indi-
viduals with the name “Hill”).
18. Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomm. On Trade-Marks of the H.
Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong. 40 (1939) (statement of Edward S. Rogers,
attorney).
19. See Kimberly Clark Corp. v. Marzall, 94 F. Supp. 254, 257 (D.D.C. 1950).
The Court noted:
The spirit and the intent of the entire Act indicate that Congress intended
to codify the law of unfair competition in regard to the use of personal
names as it has been developed by the courts. . . .  At common law it was
held that every man had an absolute right to use his own name.
Id.
20. In re Hall Wines, L.L.C., 2009 WL 625580, at *6 (T.T.A.B. 2009) (non-
precedential) (quoting with approval In re Joint-Stock Co. “Baik,” 84 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1921, 1924 (T.T.A.B. 2007) (non-precedential) (Seeherman, J., concur-
ring)); accord TRADEMARK MANUAL, supra note 15, § 1211 (“The common law R
also recognizes that surnames are shared by more than one individual, each of
whom may have an interest in using his surname in business.”).
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their surnames benefits the proprietors and the purchasing public
alike.21  The proprietor’s surname comes to reflect both the per-
sonal and the commercial reputation arising from the quality of the
services offered by the business.22  The proprietor benefits when
consumers choose to give their business to the enterprise identified
by the surname as a result of the reputation of the proprietor.23
Consumers benefit from the direct information conveyed by the
business name when it identifies an individual proprietor whom
consumers know and can judge.24
The Lanham Act recognizes that despite the descriptive nature
of surname trademarks, consumers may come to recognize surname
trademarks as unique source identifiers in some instances.  Section
2(f) permits registration of surname trademarks (and other terms
that lack inherent distinctiveness) once they have acquired distinc-
tiveness.25  Guidance from the Trademark Office explains that the
Lanham Act
reflects the common law that exclusive rights in a surname per se
cannot be established without evidence of long and exclusive use
that changes its significance to the public from that of a surname
to that of a mark for particular goods or services. . . . [B]y the
requirement for evidence of distinctiveness, the law, in effect, de-
lays appropriation of exclusive rights in the name.26
Under this theory, a surname trademark starts identifying one
anonymous source “that unequivocally denotes a particular eco-
nomic activity” once it has acquired distinctiveness.27
II. THE NATURE OF SURNAME TRADEMARKS
A. Surnames and Trademarks Do Not Define Categories, But
Rather Refer to Particular People or Sources
Before going further, it will help to discuss relevant similarities
between trademarks and surnames, particularly in contrast to other
types of words.  Starting definitionally, both surnames and trade-
marks lack sense—a term defined by the philosopher Gottlob Frege
21. Russell W. Jacobs, Recapturing Rareness: The Significance of Surname
Rareness in Trademark Registration Determinations, 50 IDEA 395, 400 (2010).
22. Id. at 395.
23. Id. at 400.
24. Id.
25. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2018).
26. TRADEMARK MANUAL, supra note 15, § 1211 (emphasis in original). R
27. Giovanni B. Ramello & Francesco Silva, Appropriating Signs and Mean-
ing: The Elusive Economics of Trademark, 15 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 937,
945–46 (2006) [hereinafter Ramello & Silva].
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in On Sense and Reference and used in the fields of linguistics and
psychology.28  What does it mean for a word to have, or lack, sense?
For an answer to that question, consider the common noun “par-
sons.”  In its usage as a common noun the word has sense in that it
means “Protestant clergy.”29  The word defines a category of people
all of whom share the same characteristics, from which the word
derives its sense.  In this case, all parsons share the same character-
istic of having the occupation of “Protestant clergy.”
On the other hand, surnames and trademarks lack sense as
they do not define a category of people or things that all share
meaningful characteristics unique to them as opposed to the gen-
eral population.30  With respect to surnames, while some people
with the surname Parsons may happen to have characteristics in
common (e.g., a hobby or a favorite food) those commonalities do
not arise as a result of the surname.  One cannot predict with accu-
racy any traits common to two people who happen to share the
same surname.31  Knowing of the actor Jim Parsons does not pro-
vide any useful information about someone named Antwon Par-
sons.  Looking at the word “baker” as another example, consider
that meeting two people and learning that one works as a “baker”
and another has the name “Baker,” the first use of the word
28. Gottlob Frege, Uber Sinn und Bedeutung, in FUNKTION, BEGRIFF,
BEDEUTUNG.  (Patzig G. ed. 1892).
29. Parson, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://bit.ly/2nfJTDP [https://perma.cc/
5VDQ-E2HT] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (defining word as “rector” or “clergyman;
especially: a Protestant pastor”).
30. Stefan Oltean, On the Semantics of Proper Names, in ONOMASTICS IN
CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC SPACE 50, 56 (Alina Bughesiu & Oliviu Felecan eds.,
2013) (stating proper names “denote a single individual with respect to a given
possible world ‘a class as many as of one object [. . .] identical with that object’,
where ‘there is no empty class as many’.  In other words, they introduce a constant
– a, b, c, the entity associated with the name – at the level of logical form.”); see
also Richard Coates, Properhood, 82 LANGUAGE 356, 358 (2006). Coates notes:
[S]ome words are applicable in principle to individuals and others to clas-
ses of individuals, in virtue of the very properties of individuality or
classhood; and because of such individualizing, proper names apply dis-
cretely in semantic space (‘[l]e proprium du nom proper est de ne pas
admettre un champ d’indétermination’:  ‘what is proprium about proper
names is that they do not allow any scope for indeterminacy’, and
properhood involves divided ( = discrete—RC) reference.
Id. (quoting Pierre Swiggers, La Nature du Nom Propre: un Point de Vue Guil-
laumien, 26 ONOMA 45 (1982)) (citing Willy van Langendonck, On the Theory of
Proper Names, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF ON-
OMASTIC SCIENCE, CRACOW 63 (Kazimierz Rymut ed. 1978)).
31. TIM VALENTINE ET AL., THE COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. OF PROPER NAMES:
THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ERNEST 107–08 (1996) [hereinafter BEING ERNEST]
(noting that the name “Baker” does not categorize people with that name because
they share certain traits).
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“baker”—the common noun—reveals more about the person since
the term categorizes and conveys consistent traits shared by all
those with that profession, while the second “Baker”—the proper
name—has only an arbitrary connection to the person and those
bearing the name do not share any meaningful, distinguishable
traits.32  A surname may refer to a specific person or family, but it
does not define a group of people.  Likewise, trademarks lack sense
as they do not define a generic category of things defined by shared
characteristics.  The trademark PARSONS refers to particular
goods (e.g., golf clubs) associated with one source (Parsons Xtreme
Golf, LLC), but PARSONS does not define either the goods or the
source.33  A word has sense when it defines and lacks sense when it
refers.
Lacking sense means that both surnames and trademarks have
a denotative function, i.e., they refer to a particular person or a
product coming from an anonymous source.34  While common
words have multiple referents within a category (e.g., many “bak-
ers”), each surname and each trademark has only one referent—
either a person with the name (a Dr. Baker) or a particular product
coming from an anonymous source (the BAKER bicycle coming
from one company).35  Barton Beebe has looked at this referential
32. Id. (citing Gillian Cohen, Recognition and Retrieval of Proper Names: Age
Differences in the Fan Effect, 2 EUR. J. OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 193 (1990); then
citing Gillian Cohen, Why Is It Difficult to Put Names to Faces?, 81 BRIT. J. OF
PSYCHOL., 287 (1990); then citing Kathryn H. McWeeny et al., Putting Names to
Faces, 78 BRIT. J. OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 143 (1987); then citing Carlo
Semenza & Marina Zettin, Generating Proper Names: A Case of Selective Inability,
5 COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 711 (1988); and then citing Carlo Semenza &
Marina Zettin, Evidence from Aphasia for the Role of Proper Names as Pure Refer-
ring Expressions, 342 NATURE 678 (1989)).
33. See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Ser. No. 86/666,031 (filed June 17,
2015) (abandoned).
34. See Laura A. Heymann, Naming, Identity, and Trademark Law, 86 INDI-
ANA L.J. 381, 391–92 (2011).
35. Carlo Semenza, The Neuropsychology of Proper Names, 24 MIND & LAN-
GUAGE 347, 348 (2009) [hereinafter Neuropsychology of Proper Names] (“In sum,
proper names essentially refer to individuals (or individual groups) while common
names refer to categories.  Another useful way of expressing this distinction is that
proper names have only ‘token’ reference while common names carry ‘type refer-
ence.’” (quoting RAY JACKENDOFF, SEMANTICS AND COGNITION (1983))); Carlo
Semenza, Retrieval Pathways for Common and Proper Names, 42 CORTEX 884, 884
(2006) [hereinafter Retrieval Pathways] (“Proper names are thought to relate to
their reference in a ‘token’ (individual) as opposed to ‘type’ (categorical) fashion,
which is the case for common nouns.  In other words, while proper names refer to
individual entities, common nouns refer to categories of items.”).  While many
people may have the name “Baker” or products from different purveyors may
bear the trademark BAKER, in each particular usage the surname or trademark
refers to only one person or source of goods.
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function of trademarks through the field of semiotics—the study of
signs and symbols.  He sets out a semiological view of a trademark
as consisting of a word—the signifier—which points to particular
goods or services—the referent—that comes from a signified—a
specific source and its associated goodwill.36  “When [the word
‘trademark’] is used to describe the whole, the term ‘trademark’
refers to the relational system consisting of the tangible signifier(s),
the source or goodwill signified, and their connection to a referent
or a set of referents.”37  This denotative function of identifying a
particular product by its source defines the function of a
trademark.38
People process both trademarks and surnames “almost entirely
free of meaning” because both types of words directly identify spe-
cific sources or people.”39  As explained by linguist Richard Coates,
these types of words “apply/denote/refer directly, therefore, and
they do so in virtue of nothing but their arbitrary link with what
they apply to (their denotata/referents).”40  Per cognitive psycholo-
gist Carlo Semenza
the main theoretical idea which has its origins in philosophy is
that, unlike common names, proper names possess reference, but
not (except perhaps in minor role) sense, i.e., they may be consid-
ered ‘pure referring expressions’ . . . or, as some prefer . . . as loci
of identifying ‘descriptions’.41
Semenza also notes that “[c]hanging basic features and properties
over time does not change the proper name of a given single en-
tity.”42  Linguist Stefan Oltean agrees, observing that “[p]roper
names of individuals emerge as non-descriptive, rigid designators,
whose meaning lies exclusively in their denotation.  As such, their
contribution to the semantic content of the sentence lies in the indi-
36. Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L.
REV. 621, 646 (2004) (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 649.
38. Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK
REP. 523, 537 (1988) (“Most of the value of any trademark will be created with its
identification with the product.”); Heymann, supra note 34, at 393–94; Ramello & R
Silva, supra note 27, at 946 (“the ‘source distinctiveness’ serves to identify the R
maker of a good . . .”).
39. Tim Brennen, On the Meaning of Personal Names: A View from Cognitive
Psychol., 48 NAMES 139, 143 (2000) [hereinafter Meaning of Personal Names].
40. Coates, supra note 30, at 363 (citing JOHN S. MILL, SYSTEM OF LOGIC R
§ 1.2.1ff (1843)).
41. Neuropsychology of Proper Names, supra note 35, at 347. R
42. Retrieval Pathways, supra note 35, at 884 (citing Gottlob Frege, Uber Sinn R
und Bedeutung, in FUNKTION, BEGRIFF, BEDEUTUNG (Patzig G ed. 1892); and then
citing SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1980)).
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viduals they denote, and not in descriptive contents.”43  Cognitive
psychologists Tim Valentine, Tim Brennen, and Serge Brédart like-
wise observe that since “proper names cannot consist of a definite
description, or a cluster of definite descriptions . . . proper names
have no meaning.”44
While neither surnames nor trademarks carry any sense, they
convey information through prior associations and developing as-
sociations.  First, by prior associations, I mean that people will rely
on their prior experience with the same string of letters or similar
letter strings to try to understand the function of the word in the
new context.45  As Coates explains, “[w]e can distinguish two
modes of referring, one SEMANTIC, where the entailments accru-
ing from the words used in particular structures are preserved in-
tact, and one ONYMIC, where they are not.”46  In trademark
language, a “semantic” term remains descriptive since the entail-
ments persist as the principal way the consumer understands the
term. On the other hand, an “onymic” term has acquired distinc-
tiveness because any prior associations with the homograph have
faded and the term comes to identify, solely or principally, the new
referent.47
Second, by developing associations, I mean that people form
personal opinions and memories about the surname or trademark
over time.  In this way, these types of words “connote:  they com-
municate, either directly or by suggestion, certain characteristics
about a person or good, whether actual or aspirational.”48  Coates
explains that personal names “may set up cultural expectations and
carry a great deal of social information.”49  Cognitive psychologist
Carlo Semenza observes that such social information will combine
uniquely to identify a particular individual: “The set of attributes
labelled by a proper name, instead, combine together incidentally,
being related to each other only by virtue of belonging to entities
that are unique.”50  Fellow cognitive psychologists Tim Valentine,
Tim Brennen, and Serge Brédart provide the following illustration
43. Oltean, supra note 30, at 63. R
44. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 14. R
45. Coates, supra note 30, at 368 (discussing prior entailments of words). R
46. Id.
47. See Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f)
(2018); TRADEMARK MANUAL, supra note 15, § 1209.01(b) (discussing R
descriptiveness).
48. Heymann, supra note 34, at 391–92. R
49. Coates, supra note 30, at 364. R
50. Neuropsychology of Proper Names, supra note 35, at 348. Accord BEING R
ERNEST, supra note 31, at 13 (citing OTTO JESPERSEN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF GRAM- R
MAR 67 (1965) (“Similarly, Jespersen (1965) suggested that the meaning of a
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of the connotative function:  “the meaning of Mikhaı̈l Gorbachev
would be something like ‘the man who introduced pereistroı̈ka to
the USSR’, ‘the man with a birthmark on his forehead’, ‘the man
who received the Nobel prize for peace in 1990’.”51
Likewise, trademarks connote brand identity or brand charac-
teristics, for example, in prior years, the intimate association of the
trademark KODAK with photographic equipment.52  Law profes-
sor Barton Beebe provides current examples: “The trademark IBM
may stand for technological achievement, COKE and PEPSI for
youth, WAL-MART for affordability.”53  Justice Frankfurter noted
the importance of these associations in 1942:
The protection of trademarks is the law’s recognition of the psy-
chological function of symbols.  If it is true that we live by sym-
bols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. . . .  The
owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every
effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the
drawing power of a congenial symbol.54
In the vocabulary of trademarks, the phrase “secondary mean-
ing” reflects these developing associations, which develop over time
as consumers interact more and more with the trademarks and cre-
ate an association between the signifier trademark and a signified
single, anonymous source.55
B. The Distinctiveness of Surname Trademarks
The linguistic and psychological observations that neither
trademarks nor surnames have any sense prompt an important
question about whether to characterize surname trademarks as de-
scriptive or distinctive.  As discussed supra in Section II, the ratio-
nale for § 2(e)(4) of the Lanham Act comes not only from a desire
to allow individuals to operate businesses under their names, but
also from a belief that consumers will regard surnames as descrip-
tive terms that identify the source of the goods.  The TTAB has
classified surnames as descriptive terms, arguing that locking up ex-
proper name is ‘the complex of qualities characteristic of the bearer of the
name.’”)).
51. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 13 (citing GENNARO CHIERCHIA & R
SALLY MCCONNELL-GINET, MEANING AND GRAMMAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO SE-
MANTICS (1990)).
52. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 22. R
53. Id.
54. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,
205 (1942).
55. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir.
1970) (“Secondary meaning has been defined as association, nothing more.”).
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clusive trademark rights in a surname would keep competitors from
using “a descriptive term to describe their own goods or services.”56
What does the Board mean with it calls surname trademarks “de-
scriptive”?  Trademark law assesses descriptiveness through a scale
of distinctiveness that goes from generic terms at the low end,
through descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary terms, to fanciful
terms at the high end of the scale.57  A “merely descriptive” term
immediately conveys a “quality, feature, function, or characteristic”
of the goods or services offered under that term.58  While trade-
mark law traditionally fits surname trademarks in the category of
merely descriptive terms, I propose that the multi-disciplinary
scholarship supports conceiving of these not as merely descriptive
terms but instead as arbitrary marks, i.e., marks that have no appar-
ent inherent connection to the goods and services offered under the
mark.59  The other categories on the scale of distinctiveness do not
have relevance to surname trademarks:  generic terms directly iden-
tify the goods or services by their common name used by all traders
in space (such as “golf clubs” for the sporting equipment or “ap-
ples” for the fruit), suggestive marks require imagination to link the
mark to the goods and services, and coined terms have no function
other than as a trademark (such as KODAK).60
The assessment of whether the term falls into the descriptive or
arbitrary classification depends on the entailments that come from
other uses of the homograph and the extent to which they remain
with the homograph when adopted as a trademark.  For example,
cognitive psychologist Brennen observed that when we encounter a
name (for him, this includes both surnames and trademarks), we
may associate those entailments with the trademark “the first few
times we encounter them, but in the long run, as suggested by the
cognitive literature, we process names almost entirely free of mean-
ing.”61  From this perspective, descriptive terms do not become
56. In re Hall Wines, L.L.C., No. 78926151, 2009 WL 625580, at *6 (T.T.A.B.
2009) (non-precedential) (quoting with approval In re Joint-Stock Co. “Baik” 84
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1921, 1924 (T.T.A.B. 2007) (non-precedential) (Seeherman, J.,
concurring)); see also TRADEMARK MANUAL, supra note 15, § 1211 (“The common R
law also recognizes that surnames are shared by more than one individual, each of
whom may have an interest in using his surname in business.”).
57. TRADEMARK MANUAL, supra note 15, § 1209.01. R
58. TRADEMARK MANUAL, supra note 15, § 1209.01(b). R
59. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 289 (1987); see also Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1976) (discussing different classifica-
tions of trademarks).
60. Landes & Posner, supra note 59, at 279 (1987). R
61. Meaning of Personal Names, supra note 39, at 143. R
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trademarks because they retain the entailments of a pre-existing al-
ternate use of the homograph.  On the other hand, arbitrary terms
shed those entailments (or at least the trademark associations dom-
inate) so that consumers link the trademark with a particular refer-
ent, i.e., a particular source of goods or services, and not whatever
sense the homograph had or has in its non-trademark function(s).
This Section sets out the arguments for considering surname trade-
marks as descriptive and then, in the alternative, as arbitrary.  Sec-
tion IV will explore these alternatives from multi-disciplinary
perspectives.
1. Surname Trademarks as Descriptive Terms That Identify the
Source of the Goods
The argument for treating a surname trademark as descriptive
unfolds in the following way.  The surname trademark directly iden-
tifies the source of the goods or services as the surname trademark
identifies the person or family that created or sold them.  Since sur-
names do not categorize but rather refer to a specific bearer,62 a
surname trademark also refers to that same specific bearer as the
source of the goods.  Trademarks, historically, emerged as direct
identifications of the merchants or craftspeople who purveyed or
created the goods.63  In mercantile capitalism, the tradesperson ap-
plied his or her surname as a trademark to goods as a signal of
personal reputation and craftsmanship (with the surname some-
times even deriving from their trade).64  Economists Giovanni
Ramello and Francesco Silva noted:
[W]ith the advent of organized trade, the economic virtues of
signs became more widely apparent as the informational effect of
the sign—having become at least implicitly a trademark—re-
solved the problem of how to identify the provenance of a good
(i.e., its maker), as the distance between the points of production
and consumption increased.65
62. Neuropsychology of Proper Names, supra note 35, at 348 (“In sum, proper R
names essentially refer to individuals (or individual groups) while common names
refer to categories.  Another useful way of expressing this distinction is that proper
names have only ‘token’ reference while common names carry ‘type reference.’”);
accord Retrieval Pathways, supra note 35, at 884; BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at R
16 (“a name should identify the bearer”) (citing CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, C. LA
PENSÉE SAUVAGE (1962)).
63. Paul Manning, The Semiotics of Brand, 39 ANN. REV. OF ANTHROPOLOGY
33, 37 (2010).
64. Sergey Goryaev & Olga Olshvang, Anthroponyms in Commercial Name
Models: Surname Imitation, 2 PROCEEDINGS OF ICONN 148, 155 (2013) [hereinaf-
ter Surname Imitation]; Manning, supra note 63, at 37. R
65. Ramello & Silva, supra note 27, at 943 (citations omitted). R
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Thus, consumers would expect that the PARSONS golf club
comes from someone bearing the surname “Parsons” or that some-
one named “Baker” sells the BAKER bikes.  In this way the sur-
name trademark fulfills its denotative function by identifying the
source of the goods—one known person or family bearing that
surname.66
If, however, the surname trademark does not fulfill its denota-
tive function then it does not meet the definition of a descriptive
term. A surname trademark may fail to fulfill its denotative function
in one of two ways:  (1) the goods might not come from anyone
bearing the surname, or (2) the goods might come from someone
bearing the surname but consumers do not know which particular
person with the surname offers the goods.  First, any business could
adopt a surname trademark for their products even if no one at the
business bears that surname.  While the business might adopt the
surname trademark out of a desire to create a false association with
someone bearing that name, deceptive intent may not have driven
the choice.  For example, the term might have other functions than
as a surname—consider the name “Baker” which also has a mean-
ing of someone who makes breads, pastries, or desserts.  Or, the
business might adopt the surname trademark out of an affinity for
the look and sound of the term without any intention of claiming
any association with someone bearing that name.  Alternatively, the
business might not recognize the surname function of an obscure
surname.
Second, a surname trademark may fail its denotative function
when consumers do not make the connection between the surname
trademark and a particular person or family.  Cognitive psycholo-
gists Valentine, Brennen, and Brédart observed that the surname
“Bush” corresponds to multiple individuals bearing that name
(George Bush, Kate Bush, etc.) and readers only access the lexical
node Bush via the nodes for each of those individuals.67  Likewise,
many people share the surname “Moore” (Roger Moore, Dudley,
Demi Moore, Viviene Moore, etc.).68  Experiments have shown that
even children think that a name “can have a plurality of bearers”.69
In the terminology of semiotics, the surname has multiple potential
signifieds—it could refer to multiple potential individuals or fami-
66. Heymann, supra note 34, at 391–92. R
67. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 105. R
68. Id. at 5.
69. Gabriel Segal, Two Theories of Names, 16 MIND & LANGUAGE 547,
558–59 (2001).
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lies.70  “At the very least, unique denotation must be replaced with
a context-based notion like saliency to the individual user such that
s/he is aware of only one denotatum.”71  This scholarship highlights
a feature inherent in surnames:  multiple people share each sur-
name, so use of a name without context might not identify a partic-
ular referent.  Thus, surname trademarks create ambiguity about the
source since they could come from any of those multiple individuals
bearing that name or from a business with no association to the
name.  This failure of the denotative function points to the second
element of the anonymity heuristic: consumers do not believe a sur-
name trademark identifies a particular person or family.
If a surname trademark does not identify a particular source
because it refers to multiple unrelated people who happen to bear
the name, then consumers cannot tell which particular individual or
family offers the goods or services bearing the surname trademark,
and it does not describe the source.72  Failing to meet the definition
of descriptive marks, surname trademarks would then belong to
one of the categories of deceptively misdescriptive or arbitrary
marks.  Deceptive misdescriptiveness refers to a situation where the
mark falsely conveys a connection between the goods and the
source or its characteristics.73  A business that distributes marketing
materials referencing an individual bearing a surname with an in-
tention to create the false impression of sponsorship or affiliation
between the business and that individual has adopted a misdescrip-
tive (or deceptive) trademark.  Otherwise, the surname trademark
belongs in the category of arbitrary marks.
2. Surname Trademarks as Arbitrary Marks That Have No
Connection to the Characteristics of the Goods
The argument for treating a surname trademark as an arbitrary
mark goes as follows.  The surname trademark does not convey any
information about a characteristic or quality of the goods or ser-
vices.  Nor does a surname trademark describe the source of the
goods since consumers do not expect that a trademark points di-
70. Beebe, supra note 36, at 646. R
71. Coates, supra note 30, at 362 (stylization normalized). R
72. Ramello & Silva, supra note 27, at 945–46 (2006). R
73. TRADEMARK MANUAL, supra note 15, § 1209.04.  The manual states: R
A term that conveys an immediate idea of an ingredient, quality, charac-
teristic, function, or feature of the goods or services with which it is used
is merely descriptive.  If a term immediately conveys such an idea but the
idea is false, although plausible, then the term is deceptively misdescrip-
tive and is unregistrable under §[ ]2(e)(1).
Id.
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rectly to the name of the company or individual that manufactured
or supplied the goods.  As times have changed since mercantile cap-
italism, in modern commerce people do not limit their working
prospects to the field identified by their surname, so a Baker need
not bake and a Miller need not work at the mill.  The realm of
trademarks has likewise expanded beyond personal trademarks
that identify a craftsperson by name.
People now organize economic activities through corporations
more so than direct person-to-person sales.74  Consumers under-
stand that goods come from anonymous or fictive sources in the
form of these corporations.75  Even as early as 1904, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged this consumer understand-
ing in a case involving a surname trademark: “We may safely take it
for granted that not one in a thousand knowing of or desiring to
purchase ‘Baker’s Cocoa’ . . . know of Walter Baker & Co., Lim-
ited.”76  Consumers do not expect that the denotative function of
trademarks operates in a one-to-one correspondence between the
trademark and the name of the source—BAKER’S cocoa might or
might not come from someone named “Baker.”  These observa-
tions about modern commerce lend credence to the first component
of the anonymity heuristic, namely that consumers view a trade-
mark as identifying an unknown, anonymous source.
The incorporation of the fictive source as a fundamental fea-
ture of trademark law has shifted the concept of descriptiveness to
refer to a term that immediately conveys qualities, characteristics,
functions, features, purposes, or uses of the goods or services,
rather than the source of those goods or services.77  But a surname
trademark does not identify any qualities or characteristics of the
goods—PARSONS does not identify the weight or materials or
74. Manning, supra note 63, at 37 (“However, the producer or source indexed R
is, in fact, usually a fictive person such as a corporation and therefore does not
correspond precisely to either of these earlier figures of mercantile capitalism, al-
though as imagined figures they both continue to haunt the modern imaginary of
brand . . .”).
75. Economides, supra note 38, at 527 (“The consumer of NABISCO R
WHEAT THINS knows and cares little about source (manufacturer).  Rather the
consumer identifies the trademark with the features of the commodity, including
crispness, sweetness or lack thereof, color, and the like.”); see also Frank I.
Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 816
(1927).
76. Walter Baker & Co. v. Slack, 130 F. 514, 518 (7th Cir. 1904).
77. E.g., Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. JustGoGirl, LLC, 2018 WL
5307159, at *3 (T.T.A.B. 2018) (non-precedential) (granting cancellation and op-
position to registration of the marks ATHLETIC LEAKS, FITNESS LEAKS,
WORKOUT LEAKS, and RUN LEAKS in connection with feminine hygiene
pads and related goods as merely descriptive).
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other attribute of the golf clubs.  A consumer will not learn any-
thing about the function or features of a product by the surname
associated with it, recalling that a surname has no sense and there-
fore cannot convey any such information.  Accordingly, the sur-
name trademark does not fall in the category of descriptive terms.
Instead, the surname trademark has a function other than re-
ferring to someone bearing that name.  This process of taking an
existing term and giving it a non-descriptive trademark function de-
fines the category of arbitrary trademarks.  Law professor Jake Lin-
ford explains this process:
When establishing an arbitrary mark, the trademark owner ap-
plies an existing word to a product for which the word has not
been commonly used and which neither suggests nor describes
any ingredient, quality, or characteristic of the product.  Estab-
lishing an arbitrary trademark is thus a process of creating a new
homonym:  a new meaning for a pre-existing word that is unre-
lated to that word’s established meanings.78
Law professor Laura Heymann elaborates on a common example
to explain the concept of arbitrary marks:
The word “apple” as a common noun denotes a red fruit of the
genus Malus and connotes the color red, a sweet, crunchy taste,
and the concept of healthful food. Applied to consumer electron-
ics, however, the word “Apple” both denotes and connotes
something entirely different.  The word, of course, is identical
(save for the capital letter, which cannot be indicated in oral
communication); it is the combination of functions that allows it
to serve, in a particular context, as a trademark.79
While the arbitrary trademark (e.g., APPLE) and the common
noun (e.g., “apple”) have the same spelling and sound, the mind
stores and accesses each of the different functions of the homo-
graph separately.80  As discussed further infra in Section IV.B., the
consumer will consider the context in which s/he encounters the
term and regard it as a surname or a trademark, but not both.  In
this way, semantic shift occurs by which the word gains a new hom-
ographic function of distinguishing the source of goods or ser-
78. Jake Linford, The False Dichotomy Between Suggestive and Descriptive
Trademarks, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367, 1407 (2015).
79. Heymann, supra note 34, at 394. R
80. Linford, supra note 78, at 1399–1400 (“Homonymous words are thus R
stored as different entries and accessed separately in the mental lexicon.”).
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vices,81 shifting the referent of the homograph from the known
person in the original function to particular goods that come from
an anonymous signified, and “the semiotic device/information ac-
quires a specific economic value that is independent of its associ-
ated product.”82  Through semantic shift the homograph gains a
new interpretation—as an arbitrary trademark.
III. CONSUMERS PROCESS A SURNAME TRADEMARK AS
HAVING A UNIQUE TRADEMARK FUNCTION
The question of whether surname trademarks belong to the
category of descriptive terms or the category of arbitrary trade-
marks depends on whether consumers regard the word as having
multiple referents or only one.  If consumers understand the term
not as a homograph with both surname and trademark interpreta-
tions but rather as a word that always refers to one particular per-
son or family then they will believe that the goods come from that
same, known referent bearing the surname.  In that case the sur-
name trademark falls in the category of descriptive terms.  But if
the surname used as a trademark has two referents—one to identify
an individual bearing that name and another to identify particular
goods—then the consumer distinguishes between the surname and
trademark interpretations and the term belongs to the category of
arbitrary marks.
To explore this question of consumer perception, this Section
looks beyond trademark jurisprudence to scholarship in the fields
of cognitive psychology, linguistics, anthropology, sociology, mar-
keting, and economics.  The multi-disciplinary literature supports
the hypothesis that surname trademarks belong to the category of
arbitrary trademarks because the trademark roles of these terms
overcome their surnames origins and become new and separate
homograph entries for the terms.  Further, the literature supports
the anonymity heuristic since consumers understand the trademark
as representing the fictive source of goods but not directly identify-
ing an individual or family as the purveyor of those goods.
A. Readers Process Words to Resolve Ambiguity
Consumers may find a surname trademark ambiguous when
they first encounter it since they have no prior engagements with
81. Andreas Blank, Why Do New Meanings Occur? A Cognitive Typology of
Motivations for Lexical Semantic Change, in HISTORICAL SEMANTICS AND COGNI-
TION 61, 82–83 (Andreas Blank & Peter Koch eds., 1999).
82. Ramello & Silva, supra note 27, at 947–48. R
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the word.  Linguists Ekaterini Klepousniotou and Shari R. Baum
highlight that
[h]omonymous words are assumed to have a single phonolical/
orthographic representation in the mental lexicon which is associ-
ated with multiple semantic representations.  Thus, they have
their different meanings represented separately in the lexicon,
and are, therefore, understood by selecting their intended mean-
ing from a (presumably exhaustive) list of potential meanings.
Thus, homonymy requires the process of sense selection.  In ho-
monymy, the ambiguity is already established and the different
meanings (i.e., the semantic representations) of the word pre-ex-
ist and are stored separately in the mental lexicon from where
they are selected when required.  Thus, when a homonymous
word is encountered, its multiple unrelated meanings are com-
peting for activation, slowing down the word recognition
process.83
Despite any initial confusion, the multi-disciplinary literature
points to a non-ambiguity heuristic through which people quickly
reconcile ambiguities in language.  Cognitive psychology research
has found that when people encounter lexical ambiguity in homo-
graphs they can simultaneously access multiple functions of that
term (e.g., Baker the surname and baker the occupation), but will
resolve the ambiguity in favor of one appropriate interpretation,
keeping the prior associations segregated.84  The different interpre-
tations “remain representationally distinct in our minds, despite
their linguistic adjacence.”85  Linguist Andreas Blank emphasizes
efficiency and relevance in discourse as drivers to resolve ambigu-
ity, noting that speakers “want to communicate successfully and
that they produce innovations any time they judge it to be the most
successful strategy.”86
People often use an inherency heuristic to find an appropriate
interpretation for an unfamiliar word.  While the context in which
the word appears matters, linguists Klepousniotou and Baum found
that “[a]mbiguous words can also be recognized in isolation.  Upon
presentation of an ambiguous word in isolation, we are normally
83. Ekaterini Klepousniotou & Shari R. Baum, Disambiguating the Ambiguity
Advantage Effect in Word Recognition: An Advantage for Polysemous but Not Ho-
monymous Words, 20 J. OF NEUROLINGUISTICS 1, 17 (2007).
84. See BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 71. R
85. Timothy Greene, Trademark Hybridity and Brand Protection, 46 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 75, 90 (2014).
86. Andreas Blank, Why Do New Meanings Occur? A Cognitive Typology of
the Motivations for Lexical Semantic Change, in HISTORICAL SEMANTICS AND
COGNITION 61, 63 (2013).
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able to identify an appropriate meaning and we are often unaware
of alternate meanings.”87  Cognitive psychologists Mark Seiden-
berg, Michael Tanenhaus, James Leiman, and Marie Bienkowski
summarized remarkable research finding that the brain automati-
cally accesses lexical information like meanings, sounds, and spell-
ing for each word irrespective of “[t]he nature of the context and
the listener’s knowledge.”88  Anthropologist Andrew Wong has de-
tailed studies showing that consumers may resolve the ambiguity
arising from their lack of knowledge of the signified of an unfamil-
iar trademark by finding value through sound symbolism.89  “This
and other studies . . . show that, since the vowels and consonants in
unfamiliar brand names trigger powerful associations in consumers’
minds, they serve as an effective means for transmitting brand- and
product-related information.”90
While sound symbolism remains a nascent field with limited
predictive capacity, scholars have long recognized the importance
of the contextual heuristic—i.e., using context to determine the ap-
propriate interpretation of a word.  According to linguists Klepous-
nitou and Baum, when people encounter lexical ambiguity (where
one string of letters can have multiple interpretations) they usually
select the appropriate interpretation “based on the context in which
the ambiguous word occurs.”91  Psychologists Lin Wang, Rinus
Verdonschot, and Yufang Yang concur:  “It has been well estab-
lished that context can facilitate the lexical retrieval of words and
that people immediately integrate all available information into the
context . . . .”92  Legal scholar Laura Heymann agrees:  “All that is
required is that the speaker and the listener (or the company and
the consumer) understand what is meant by a particular reference
87. Klepousniotou & Baum, supra note 83, at 2. R
88. Mark Seidenberg et al., Automatic Access of the Meanings of Ambiguous
Words in Context: Some Limitations of Knowledge-Based Processing, 14 COGNI-
TIVE PSYCHOL. 489, 532 (1982).
89. Andrew Wong, Branding and Linguistic Anthropology: Brand Names, In-
dexical Fields, and Sound Symbolism, 36 PRACTICING ANTHROPOLOGY 38, 39
(2014) (citing Tina Lowrey & L. J. Shrum, Phonetic Symbolism and Brand Name
Preference, 34 J. OF CONSUMER RES. 406 (2007); and then citing Eric Yorkston &
Geeta Menon, A Sound Idea: Phonetic Effects of Brand Names on Consumer
Judgments, 31 J. OF CONSUMER RES. 43 (2004)).
90. Id.
91. Klepousniotou & Baum, supra note 83, at 2. R
92. Lin Wang et al., The Processing Difference between Person Names and
Common Nouns in Sentence Contexts: an ERP Study, 80 PSYCHOL. RES. 94, 95
(2016) (citing Daniëlle van den Brink, Empathy Matters: ERP Evidence for Inter-
individual Differences in Social Language Processing, 7 SOC. SCI. & AFFECTIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 173 (2012); and then citing Lin Wang, Semantic Illusion Depends
on Information Structure: ERP Evidence, 1282 BRAIN RES. 50 (2009)).
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in a particular context.”93  Even when encountering an unfamiliar
usage for a familiar string of letters people can accurately decipher
the new interpretation based on context.94  Context allows people
to segregate the new interpretation from alternative, competing in-
terpretations and associations for that homograph.  As Timothy
Greene puts it:  “Whether one sense (or meaning) or another is in-
tended in a sentence depends on the context in which the term is
used.95”  So, for example, people understand APPLE and MACIN-
TOSH in context to function as trademarks in connection with com-
puters rather than to identify pieces of fruit.96  Further, people can
encounter words used in unfamiliar ways as names of dishes at res-
taurants but still come to understand the correct interpretation in
context because the menu frames the words as identifiers for meal
options despite them never having seen the words this way before.97
Cognitive psychology research highlights the particular effec-
tiveness of using context to decipher terms that lack sense.
“[P]roper names and words in restrictive phrases are read more ac-
curately because there are fewer semantic associates activated by
the stimulus.  . . . The semantics of a word may be suppressed by
presenting the item in the context of a proper name.”98  Those con-
textual presentations include certain formal cues that identify a sur-
name or trademark function.  First, both surnames and trademarks
lack articles.99  Second, surnames and trademarks have initial capi-
tal letters.100  A third cue applies to surnames, but not trademarks.
Namely, titles (Ms., Mr., Dr., etc.) identify a term as a surname.101
Since trademarks come from a nearly unbounded universe of com-
binations of words and letters, trademarks may contain such a ti-
93. Heymann, supra note 34, at 392. R
94. Id. at 438.
95. Greene, supra note 85, at 90. R
96. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 31–32 (questioning whether the name R
“Apple Macintosh” has meaning).
97. Id. at 23 (citing JOHN M. CARROLL, WHAT’S IN A NAME? AN ESSAY IN
THE PSYCHOL. OF REFERENCE (1985)).
98. Id. at 77 (citing Eleanor M. Saffran et al., Does Deep Dyslexia Reflect
Right Hemisphere Reading?, in DEEP DYSLEXIA (Max Coltheart et al. eds., 1980)).
99. Coates, supra note 30, at 367 (“It betrays its namehood by the lack of an R
article (although, as we see below, properness is a prerequisite for the loss of the
article, but the absence of an article is not definitional for properhood.”)).
100. Francesca Peressotti et al., On Recognizing Proper Names: The Ortho-
graphic Cue Hypothesis.  47 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 87, 107 (2003) (“The initial capi-
tal letter is associated with a categorical distinction between proper names and
common nouns.”).
101. See BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 111 (People would understand that R
“Mr. Dreaner” referred to a man even if they had not heard the word “dreaner”
before).
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tle—consider MRS. MEYER’S or MR. CLEAN—but the title does
not make the phrase into a trademark.102  People will understand
homographs displaying those cues as “onymic” (i.e., a name such as
a surname or a trademark) and homographs without those cues as
“semantic” (i.e., common terms).103  While the cues will identify the
function of the homograph, they may not suffice to identify the par-
ticular referent.  Common surnames or trademarks may refer to
multiple referents and partial words or misspellings can render iden-
tification particularly difficult, forcing heavy reliance on context.104
Marketing and consumer psychology research underscore the
importance of the contextual heuristic in processing trademarks.  In
a study presenting a mixture of descriptive and arbitrary terms on
boxes in the place where consumers would expect to find a trade-
mark, consumers regarded both types of terms (descriptive and ar-
bitrary) as source indicators, i.e., trademarks:
Perceptual schema theory gives reason to wonder whether and to
what extent non-linguistic signs may overwhelm the linguistic
signs credited by the law.  If a descriptive word mark is presented
in a spatial placement, size, and style that matches the con-
sumer’s schematic mental model of what a product package and
brand look like, the word may be perceived as a source indicator
even if its semantic meaning is “merely descriptive.”105
102. MRS. MEYER’S, Registration No. 3,895,933 (registration for the mark
MRS. MEYER’S in connection with, inter alia, “household cleaning products”
held by The Caldrea Company); MR. CLEAN, Registration No. 5,424,339 (regis-
tration for the mark MR. CLEAN in connection with “[p]reparations for cleaning,
removing stains, and removing mold and mildew from external household sur-
faces” held by The Proctor & Gamble Company).
103. See Coates, supra note 30, at 368. R
104. See BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 81.  The authors observed: R
[C]ommon surnames or first names alone will be insufficient to uniquely
specify a familiar individual’s name.  Although several NRUs might be
partially activated by a name (e.g., David), no one unit will be able to
become more strongly activated than its competitors and therefore iden-
tity-specific information cannot be accessed.
Id.  Moreover, the authors postulated:
The fact that the range of plausible phonologies is much wider for peo-
ple’s names than for common nouns has another implication: it should be
easier to guess the complete phonology of a target word from incomplete
phonology if that word is a common noun than if it is a person’s name.  In
other words, partial phonology accessed during recall of a person’s name
is less specifying of the target than is partial phonology during recall of a
common noun.
Id. at 111.
105. Thomas R. Lee et al., An Empirical and Consumer Psychol. Analysis of
Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033, 1099 (2009); accord Heymann,
supra note 34, at 398.  Heymann agrees that context creates a fundamental frame R
for how consumers process words:
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“Surface” cues like product packaging color and linguistic
characteristics of the trademarks will trigger consumers to process
the term as a trademark.106  Consistent use in these contexts can
make the trademark memorable.107  Unlike surface cues, “deep”
cues include “abstract, underlying functional properties of a brand
such as product and category similarity, and common or comple-
mentary usage.”108  When making purchasing decisions, consumers
rely on both surface and deep cues depending on the purchasing
environment.109  Research on trademark processing in context has
focused principally on product packaging, but since consumers will
encounter many trademarks on-line, via text message, or in conver-
sation, further research could explore the strength of trademark as-
sociations developed outside of the frame of a product package.
Nonetheless, the research still suggests that whether or not consum-
ers recognize the surname interpretation of the terms “Toyota” and
“Ford,” when consumers see the terms applied to cars, they under-
stand these words as trademarks based on the context.
The role of context in deciphering homograph interpretation
provides further evidence for the first element of the anonymity
heuristic.  Consumers evaluate the homograph in context and there-
fore understand its function as a trademark that identifies an un-
known source of goods or services, and not as having another
function.  As the homograph has a trademark-specific function in
this context, it belongs to the category of arbitrary marks since it
moves away from the entailments inherent in the non-trademark
interpretation(s) of the homograph.
B. People Process Surnames Differently than Other Words
Trademarks and surnames share many characteristics—e.g.,
lacking an article, starting with an initial capital letter, carrying no
sense, and referring rather than describing—which has led some
More generally, it is context that indicates whether an unknown term is
functioning as a trademark or name in some other way.  A consumer who
has never before encountered the word “Zazy” will likely assume, when
she sees it on the front of a box of cereal in stylized script, that the word
is functioning as a trademark.
Id.
106. See Jing Lei & Niraj Dawar, The Impact of Semantic vs. Lexical Relations
on the Strength of Inter-brand Linkages, 36 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 992,
993 (2009).
107. See Heymann, supra note 34, at 398. R
108. Lei & Dawar, supra note 106, at 993. R
109. See id.
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cognitive psychologists to classify both as proper names.110  Cogni-
tive psychology research finds differences in processing these two
word domains versus common nouns.111  According to cognitive
psychologist Carlo Semenza, “The evidence reported so far, on
both functional and anatomical grounds, favours the idea that
processing proper and common names follows at least partially in-
dependent pathways in the cognitive system and in the brain.”112
Despite the similarities between trademarks and surnames as
opposed to common nouns, the differences between them have
prompted some cognitive psychologists and linguists to put sur-
names in a separate category of proper names from trademarks.
Cognitive psychologists Valentine, Brennen, and Brédart observe
that “the use of brand names, and the entities to which they refer, is
extremely diverse.  Therefore, it is difficult to place the category of
‘brand names’ definitively within any taxonomy of proper
names.”113
Linguists Sergey Goryaev and Olga Olshvang concur, noting
that
we generally share this viewpoint, which claims that the names
related to the human economic activities (this category is re-
ferred to as ‘commercial names’ and includes notably company
and product names) are a pronounced peripheral category in
which the qualities of personal names are not fully expressed.
Thus, anthroponyms (personal names) and business names prove
to be opposites, to a large extent, in their onomastic status.114
Multiple cognitive psychological studies have shown that the
brain processes people names as a class unto themselves.  In a re-
cent study, Lin Wang, Rinus Verdonschot, and Yufang Yang con-
cluded that “[a] ‘good enough’ processing occurred for common
nouns due to their low level of specificity and thus rich semantic
associations, supporting the notion that common nouns are repre-
sented differently from person names in the brain.”115  Tim Valen-
tine, Jarrod Hollis, and Viv Moore found “that processing of people
names is carried out by a cognitive architecture that has a signifi-
110. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 5 (citing Gillian Cohen & Dorothy R
Faulkner, Memory for Proper Names: Age Differences in Retrieval.  4 BRIT. J. OF
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 187 (1986)); see discussion supra in Sections III.A.
and IV.A.
111. Retrieval Pathways, supra note 35, at 889. R
112. Neuropsychology of Proper Names, supra note 35, at 363. R
113. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 5. R
114. Surname Imitation, supra note 64, at 148. R
115. Wang, supra note 92, at 106 (citation omitted). R
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cantly different organization from processing of common
names.”116  In the study prompting that conclusion, subjects shown
a picture of a person’s face had better recall of the person’s name,
but no such benefit happened with naming objects.117  In other
studies Valentine, Moore, and Brédart found that priming test sub-
jects with a homograph of a surname had no effect on recalling the
name of a famous person with that surname when shown that per-
son’s face.118  Thus, seeing the word “bush” had no impact on recall
of the name “Bush” when shown the face of George Bush com-
pared to the control group that did not see the word “bush.”119  The
researchers concluded that “forcing subjects to process the stimulus
word to a semantic level did not induce repetition priming.”120  Val-
entine, Brennen, and Brédart determined that people access the
lexical node for a surname only through nodes for individuals bear-
ing that surname.121  This research supports the second element of
the anonymity heuristic as people process surnames through differ-
ent neural pathways than other uses of homographs sharing spelling
with the surnames, which suggests that people will process the sur-
name and trademark interpretations separately and as
unconnected.
While people can disambiguate common noun and surname
functions, people will more easily recall the non-surname interpre-
tation of a homograph.122  For example, people will more easily
learn that a face belongs to a baker (the profession) than to a Mr.
Baker (the person).123  In fact, “[p]roper names are the linguistic
category most likely to provoke retrieval difficulties in normal
healthy adults, and for some brain-injured patients proper name re-
call is their only linguistic problem.”124  Cognitive psychologists at-
116. Tim Valentine et al., On the Relationship between Reading, Listening and
Speaking: It’s Different for People’s Names, 26 MEMORY & COGNITION 740, 751
(1998) [hereinafter “Different for People’s Names”]. Accord BEING ERNEST, supra
note 31, at 157 (“The finding that production of a common name does not prime R
production of a proper name with the same phonology is consistent with separate
representations in the output lexicon(s).”).
117. Different for People’s Names, supra note 116, at 750–51. R
118. See generally Tim Valentine et al., Priming Production of People’s
Names, 48A Q.J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 513 (1995).
119. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 153. R
120. Id.
121. Id. at 107 (“So, in the case of lexical access to the common noun ‘bush’, a
large number of connections linking the propositional nodes to the lexical node
‘bush’ provide summation of priming that will make activation of the lexical node
and its connected phonological nodes likely.”).
122. Neuropsychology of Proper Names, supra note 35, at 364. R
123. Id.
124. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at xi (emphasis in original). R
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-2\DIK202.txt unknown Seq: 28 28-JAN-20 14:56
346 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:319
tribute this difference to the relatively higher familiarity with
common nouns compared with proper names.125  Tim Brennen ex-
plains that
one direct consequence of this fact is that people’s names may be
less well-learned than the best-learned semantic facts associated
to that same person, because the phonology associated to the
name may have been less frequently encountered than the pho-
nology of the common names describing facts about the
person.126
On the question of identification, rather than recall, some cog-
nitive psychology research has shown that when matched for fre-
quency, people could more quickly identify words as names than
they could identify words as nouns.127
The research further suggests a biological difference to explain
the relative difficulty in retrieval.  Semenza posits “that retrieving
proper names is a much more source-demanding task in terms of
brain metabolism than retrieving common names.  . . .  [T]he main
difference between a proper name and a common name lies in the
nature of the link the name has with its reference.”128  Cognitive
psychology research has identified a distinct location in the brain
for storing names (different from the location for non-names).129
People store names in separate nodes from the biographical infor-
mation associated with those names.130  Cognitive psychologists
posit that the different storage locations for the name and the bio-
graphical information make it harder to retrieve proper names:
“quite independently by its following a separate pathway, the re-
trieval of proper names is simply more difficult than the retrieval of
125. See Tim Brennen, The Difficulty with Recalling People’s Names: The
Plausible Phonology Hypothesis, 7 MEMORY 409, 413 (1993) [hereinafter Plausible
Phonology].
126. Id.
127. HUEI-LING YEN, PROCESSING OF PROPER NAMES IN MANDARIN CHI-
NESE: A BEHAVIORAL AND NEUROIMAGING STUDY (2006); Alice M. Proverbio et
al., ERP Indexes of Functional Differences in Brain Activation During Proper and
Common Names Retrieval, 39 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 815 (2001); Wang, supra note
92, at 94–95 (citing Horst M. Müller, Neurolinguistic Findings on the Language R
Lexicon: The Special Role of Proper Names, 53 CHINESE J. OF PHYSIOLOGY 351
(2010)).
128. Neuropsychology of Proper Names, supra note 35, at 364 (citing Carlo R
Semenza et al., The Primacy Effect in the Recall of Lists of Common and Proper
Names: A Study on Young, Elderly, and Alzheimer Disease Subjects 5 BRAIN &
LANGUAGE 45 (1996); and then citing Giovanna Pelamatti et al., Verbal Free Re-
call in High Altitude: Proper Names vs Common Names, 39 CORTEX 97 (2003)).
129. See Retrieval Pathways, supra note 35, at 890. R
130. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 48. R
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common nouns.”131  Yet, “even though the activation of a name’s
meaning is mediated by a single connection between identity-spe-
cific information and person identity node,” people can “rapidly re-
trieve” the surname interpretation of the homograph and use it in
context.132
Recall speed depends on the familiarity of the orthography:
“It is a trivial psycholinguistic finding that those expressions that
everyone accepts as being names are recovered or otherwise
processed in shorter times than descriptive referring expres-
sions.”133  When learning a new name with an unfamiliar spelling, a
person will first need to learn the spelling and then associate that
name with the individual.134  However, if someone already recog-
nizes the spelling from an existing homograph, she does not need to
learn the orthography and will only need to associate a known hom-
ograph with the individual.135  People therefore find it easier to re-
call names with already familiar spelling since they do not need to
undertake the intermediate step of learning the spelling necessary
for an unfamiliar word.136  Cognitive psychologists have also found
that unfamiliar phonologies for surnames make them harder and
slower to process and identify as surnames without seeing the full
word, while people can more easily process frequently occurring
names even without complete phonology.137  These findings seem
to point to a frequency effect where people will, unsurprisingly,
have higher recognition of names they encounter more often, but
also to the difference between recognition and recall, as people ap-
parently have an easier time recognizing a word as a surname than
recalling someone’s name.
131. Retrieval Pathways, supra note 35, at 890 (citing Gillian Cohen & R
Deborah M. Burke, Memory for Proper Names: A Review, 1 MEMORY 249 (1993)).
132. Wang, supra note 92, at 106 (citation omitted). R
133. Coates, supra note 30, at 372. R
134. Cf. Plausible Phonology, supra note 125, at 412. R
135. Cf. id.
136. Id. at 411 (noting the relative ease of recalling the name “Baker” as com-
pared to “Ryman”).
137. Id. at 416.  Brennen notes:
Even if the partial phonology that has been recalled is consistent with
only one name that is stored in a particular lexicon, the nature of the
phonology of people’s names is such that neighbouring, unfamiliar pho-
nologies are also plausible candidates.  For this reason, the accelerated
completion process cannot be so relied on for people’s names, and the
standard unaccelerated lexical process has to be relied on, in order that
the intended phonology will be sure to be produced.
Id.
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1. Surnames Can Have a Wide Range of Phonologies
The differences in the relative ease between recalling versus
recognizing surnames derives, at least in part, from the lexical ex-
pectations we have for surnames as opposed to other types of
words.  In other words, the lexical inconsistency for names makes
them harder to recall but easier to recognize.138  “The observation
that we encounter many more new people’s names than new com-
mon names means that there is a wider range of phonologies that
are plausible and acceptable for the former.”139  Indeed, cognitive
psychology literature considers all phonotactically legal terms plau-
sible for a person’s name and the domain of plausible surnames ex-
pands based on new exemplars.140  For example, if we meet
someone named “Mr. Dreaner” we would not find that name im-
permissible, even if we had never heard it before, and probably
would not think much of the name since the title “mister” clearly
identified it as a name.141  On the other hand, we would find it con-
fusing to hear that someone worked as a “dreaner” because we
have never heard of that profession.142  While we accept most sur-
names even if we find the phonology strange, the universe of ac-
ceptable names does have some limits; for example, we would not
consider the names “Mr. Biotechnologist” or “Miss Brontosaurus”
as plausible surnames.143
As a consequence of the nearly unbounded universe of sur-
name phonologies, people will have difficulty remembering exact
surname spellings and, more generally, retrieving surnames.  Com-
mon words generally have only one spelling and slight changes will
yield a different word with a different meaning, but “[t]he nature of
the phonology of people’s names is such that neighboring, unfamil-
iar phonologies are also plausible candidates.”144  For example,
changing the common noun “parsons” to “persons” yields a com-
pletely different sense that would not work in context.  On the other
hand, someone unsure of a surname might consider each of the
names “Parsons,” “Persons,” and “Parcons” a viable option and
mistakenly choose “Parcons” instead of “Parsons” when trying to
remember the right name.  These observations further support the
second element of the anonymity heuristic since consumers will
138. See BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 29, 111. R
139. Plausible Phonology, supra note 125, at 413. R
140. Id. at 415, 422.
141. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 29, 111. R
142. See id. at 111.
143. Id. at 112.
144. Plausible Phonology, supra note 125, at 416. R
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have low confidence in attributing any particular string of letters to
one particular individual.  If that letter string does not refer to any
particular person then, when used as a trademark, it cannot convey
the entailments associated with any individual.  The trademark will
necessarily belong to the category of arbitrary marks as it has no
connections with a person bearing the homograph as a surname.
2. Surname Phonologies Have Low Predictive Value
While the surname universe has almost no bounds, certain let-
ter strings commonly appear in surnames and might signal the sur-
name function of these words.  For example, many Norwegian
surnames end in the morpheme “-dahl,” many Bulgarian surnames
end in the syllable “-ov,” and Icelandic surnames end in the suffix
“-dóttir” (for females) or “-son” (for males), while Flemish and
Dutch surnames often begin with the syllable “van” and Scottish
surnames with the syllable “Mac-.”145  These cues, though, do not
point to some broader set of regularities in the word domain of
surnames by which people can categorize or predict that a term has
a surname interpretation based on certain surface forms.146  Many
personal names have no “meaningful part” that would signal a sur-
name function.147
Attempting to establish a set of rules that define the word do-
main of surnames quickly reveals two complications:  (1) words ex-
pected to function as surnames have a different interpretation, and
(2) people sharing a surname do not have anything in common
other than sharing the surname.  On the first point, the morphemes
that signal a surname function might also appear in non-surname
words.  Consider the suffix “-ic,” which signals the patronymic func-
tion of Eastern European surnames like Tomic (anglicized as
Tomic) or Coric (Coric) but also appears in English language adjec-
tives like “choric” and common nouns like “cholic.”148  This also
145. Coates, supra note 30, at 365–66; BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 27 R
(citing Plausible Phonology, supra note 125, at 30). R
146. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 27; Plausible Phonology, supra note R
125, at 415. R
147. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 30 (“However, for other people’s R
names, no such meaningful part can be discerned.”).
148. See, e.g., Tomic, WIKIPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2m16nb4 [https://perma.cc/
YX2E-ARHP] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019); Coric, WIKIPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2msyK2a
[https://perma.cc/9AYM-WLX6] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019); Colic, MERRIAM-WEB-
STER, https://bit.ly/2kYbcl8 [https://perma.cc/6853-XRVZ] (last visited Jan. 31,
2019) (defining “colic” as “an attack of acute abdominal pain localized in a hollow
organ and often caused by spasm, obstruction, or twisting”); Choric, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, https://bit.ly/2kVTWx3 [https://perma.cc/647L-KUPY] (last visited Jan.
31, 2019).
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happens with toponyms.  Many people have surnames ending in the
suffix “-ham” (e.g., Whittingham), but that suffix can also indicate a
place name (e.g., Bellingham).149  Likewise, the suffix “-burg” could
indicate a surname like “Oldenburg” or a city like “Hamburg.”150
Or the suffix “-ton” could indicate a surname “Ashton” or a loca-
tion like “Hampton.”151  Or the prefix “mc-” could start the sur-
name “McClintock” or the city “McLean.”152  These word pairs
expose the difficulty of finding any strong surname predictive
power for morphemes.
Fanciful trademarks may also incorporate typical onomastic
morphemes even if no one actually bears that term as a surname,
such as with the marks VON DUTCH, FITZALL, and KRAM-
STEIN.153  In mimicking a surname structure, these terms might
conjure an image of a proprietor with that name even when no such
person exists.  As alternative possible derivations, the mark
FITZALL might suggest the wording “fits all” instead of an Irish
surname beginning with the morpheme “fitz.” The word “von”
might point to the German word for “from” and the morpheme
“stein” to the German word for a drinking vessel.154  Like the top-
onyms that share morphemes with surnames these trademarks ex-
149. See, e.g., In re Berthold Types Ltd., 2004 WL 624564, at *3–4 (T.T.A.B.
2004) (non-precedential) (affirming refusal to register the mark WHITTINGHAM
as primarily merely a surname); Bellingham, Washington, WIKIPEDIA, https://bit.ly/
2m6qSD4 [https://perma.cc/QPV2-AR74] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
150. See Oldenburg (surname), WIKIPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2ksM2Lh [https://per
ma.cc/LCX4-S6PM] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019); Hamburg, WIKIPEDIA, https://bit.ly/
1HB20UK [https://perma.cc/Y2WE-NYQD] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
151. See, e.g., Ashton (surname), WIKIPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2ky7UVM [https://
perma.cc/LF3J-CUCM] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019); Hampton, Virginia, WIKIPEDIA,
https://bit.ly/2GHjrw6 [https://perma.cc/YH3P-V74Z] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
152. See, e.g., McClintock, WIKIPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2kYcYCO [https://perma
.cc/EG78-242A] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019); McLean, Virginia, WIKIPEDIA, https://
bit.ly/2m2IeRo [https://perma.cc/3PUK-AZZ8] (last visited Sept. 28, 2019).
153. VON DUTCH, Registration No. 2,380,173 (registration of the mark
VON DUTCH for “jackets, . . . T-shirts” by Royer Brands International S.A.R.L);
FITZALL, Registration No. 2,979,231 (registration of the mark FITZALL for
“Meters for electrical utilities for revenues and related software” by General Elec-
tric Company); KRAMSTEIN, Registration No. 5,366,255 (registration of the
mark KRAMSTEIN for “Coffee cups; Drinking steins; Shot glasses” by Daniel
Cram); Search Results for “Fitzall,” WHITEPAGES, https://bit.ly/2v4oO3a (enter
“Fitzall” in “people” field) (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (no listing in U.S. for sur-
name “Fitzall”); Search Results for “Kramstein,” WHITEPAGES, https://bit.ly/
2v4oO3a (enter “Kramstein” in “people” field) (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (no list-
ing in U.S. for surname “Kramstein”); Search Results for “Von Dutch,”
WHITEPAGES, https://bit.ly/2v4oO3a (enter “Von Dutch” in the “people” field)
(last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (no listing in U.S. for surname “Von Dutch”).
154. Translation of “Von,” GOOGLE TRANSLATE, https://bit.ly/19mznvb
[https://perma.cc/A22N-7BTB] (enter “Von” in “detect language” field) (last vis-
ited Jan. 31, 2019); Translation of “Stein,” GOOGLE TRANSLATE, https://bit.ly/
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pose the failure of a proposed rule that these letter strings would
predict a surname function for the terms.
On the second point, the assumptions that we may draw from
surnames do not always bear out as expected.  Certain morphemes
might signal not only that a word has a surname function, but also
that the name derives from a particular heritage.  For example, we
might predict that someone comes from a particular culture based
on his or her name, as “Yamato,” “Todorova,” and “Bergström”
will suggest, respectively, Japanese, Slavic, and Swedish ethnic ori-
gins.155  Not only does the suffix “-dahl” signal that a term functions
as a surname, but that the person bearing the name has Norwegian
heritage, while “-ov” indicates Bulgarian heritage, “van” indicates
Flemish or Dutch, and “Mac-” Scottish.156  In addition to cultural
background, surnames can indicate a person’s gender as Russian
women typically have surnames ending in the letter “a,” while Ice-
landic men have names ending with the suffix “-son” and Icelandic
women with the suffix “-dóttir.”157  But these predictions often fail.
For example, some surnames appear in multiple cultures, as you
could find people with the “Sinclair” surname in both France and
Britain.158  Further, names may come from a parent or a spouse
who has a different cultural background.159  At marriage, one
spouse takes the surname of the other and thereon takes on the
assumptions borne by that name even if the new name bearer does
not have a story that aligns with the expectations inherent in the
name (for example, an Asian spouse taking on the name “Hamp-
ton”).  Parents may give their children surnames made of part of
one parent’s name with another part from the other parent’s
name.160
Other than the imperfect associations with cultural background
or gender, surnames do not classify individuals or convey informa-
tion about those individuals.  Research has found isolated instances
where surnames convey information about class, birth area, relig-
ion, or birth circumstances.  For example, linguists and anthropolo-
19mznvb [https://perma.cc/A22N-7BTB] (enter “Stein” in “detect language” field)
(last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
155. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 29. R
156. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 27 (citing Plausible Phonology, supra R
note 125); Coates, supra note 30, at 365–66. R
157. Coates, supra note 30, at 365–66; Surname Imitation, supra note 64, at R
148.
158. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 29. R
159. Id. at 6–7 (citing Pascale Boucaud, La Nomination Dans le droit com-
pare, in LE NORA ET LA NOMINATION: SOURCE, SENS ET POUVOIR (Joël Clerget
ed., 1990)).
160. Id. at 7.
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gists found that surnames in parts of Scotland could identify the
birth village and Christian faith heritage of bearers of particular
surnames, while surnames in Karpathos, Greece identified the bear-
ers’ socio-economic category, and Yuman Indians give unique
names to each individual based on their birth circumstances.161  But
these examples stand out for their rarity.  While names may convey
some social information and we can make educated guesses about
people based on their names, those guesses will often turn out
wrong.162  Linguist Gabriel Segal observes “that you can infer
rather little about a person’s properties from their name. Some-
times one can have a decent shot at sex, religion, age or class. But
the reliability of such inferences can be low, and varies considerably
across cultures.”163  A surname does not identify someone’s marital
status, employment, personality, or anything else specific.164
Even though some people might derive a sense of self from
their names and comport themselves in line with the image they
think the name conveys, this does not provide evidence that sur-
names categorize people, but only that some people care about
their names.165  Others with the same name will regard the name as
merely a label and feel little to no attachment in or emotion about
the name.166  As Tim Brennen observes:
In cognitive psychology there is an empirical database and sev-
eral theoretical strands which suggest that one’s name plays no
(or very little) role in constructing, developing, and maintaining
one’s identity.  This is in stark contrast to the less structured and
often unstated—but nevertheless widespread—belief that exists
161. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 17 (citing Martha B. Kendall, Exegesis R
and Translation: Northern Yuman Names as Texts, 36 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES.
261 (1980)).
162. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 29; Coates, supra note 30, at 364 (citing, R
inter alia, WOLFGANG LAUR, DER NAME: BEITRÄGE ZUR ALLGEMEINEN
NAMENKUNDE UND IHRER GRUNDLEGUNG (BEITRÄGE ZUR NAMENFORSCHUNG
NEUE FOLGE 28) (1989)).
163. Segal, supra note 69, at 556. R
164. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 29.  The authors observe: R
That is, knowing that he is Mr Baker does not tell us whether the person
is married, what his job is, or indeed whether he has a job.  In this sense,
people’s names might be arbitrary and the information given by the name
redundant, because we would already know that the person with whom
we were communicating was English-speaking.
Id.
165. Meaning of Personal Names, supra note 39, at 144–45 (“It is of course R
possible for people to act as a function of their names, but this does not mean that
the name is necessarily such an important element.”).
166. Id. at 144 (“For others, however, their names are simply labels, in which
very little emotion or meaning is invested.”).
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regarding the central importance of one’s name for one’s
identity.167
Even if people conduct themselves based on a belief that their
surnames create expectations about their personality, character, or
station in life, nothing inherent in the name requires that they live
in accordance with those expectations.  As linguist Richard Coates
explains, “There is no necessary connection between a name includ-
ing Tunnel and a thing that is a tunnel, even if there is a strong
expectation that such a relationship will prove to be valid.”168  Re-
call the core function of a surname—to identify the bearer and dis-
tinguish him or her from others.169
This research provides further support for the second element
of the anonymity heuristic because surnames have little predictive
power and therefore will not aid consumers in identifying a particu-
lar person as the source of goods.  A consumer will have low confi-
dence that certain features in the orthography of a surname convey
or predict any meaningful information about the bearer of that
name.  A surname with an unknown referent will not convey any-
thing about the integrity or skill of bearers of the name.  The sur-
name thus carries no reputation and would have no brand image to
carry over if the homograph comes into use as a trademark.  Start-
ing with no meaningful and predictive prior associations from the
surname usage, the trademark usage thus fits in the category of ar-
bitrary marks, free to take on its own developing associations.
C. Consumers Process Trademarks Differently than Other Words
As research has shown how surnames follow their own ways of
word processing, trademarks likewise get processed in ways unique
to the trademark domain of language.  While scholarship shows
that consumers will successfully navigate ambiguous homographs so
that they identify and process trademarks as trademarks,170 this
conclusion might seem odd since trademarks do not display any
consistent traits in their spelling, length, language of origin, crea-
tion, or semantic shift from an existing function of a homograph.  In
fact, from a linguistic perspective, “there are virtually no restric-
tions in terms of language” on the selection or creation of a trade-
mark.171  And each trademark can function quite differently from
167. Id. at 139.
168. Coates, supra note 30, at 365. R
169. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 16 (citing CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, LA R
PENSÉE SAUVAGE (1962)).
170. See supra Section IV.A.
171. Surname Imitation, supra note 64, at 149. R
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others.  Some trademarks signify only perfect clone products—
every product bearing that mark has the exact same components,
finished goods, and packaging.172  Yet others function as house
marks and signify multiple products within a family, as multiple car
models bearing the trademark VOLKSWAGEN differ in size, de-
sign, color, features, and price.173
Despite these variations across trademarks, consumer behavior
scholarship indicates that consumers recognize trademarks as trade-
marks and distinguish among trademarks using trademark-specific
heuristics.174  Research shows that trademarks create distinctive im-
pressions on consumers.  For example, economist Nicolas
Economides has pointed out that some trademarks have an intrinsic
connection between the word used as a trademark and the goods
offered under it:  “For each product there may be a most appropri-
ate symbol which ex ante, before use on the product, will most ef-
fectively remind the consumer of the essential features of the
particular product.  Efficient first-comers will use and register the
symbol.”175  Neural research has also found that some trademarks
convey a brand message that activates a particular path in the brain;
functional magnetic resonance imaging has shown that each brand
produces a unique neural signature.176  Researchers can read fMRI
scans and accurately tell whether the consumer had a particular
trademark in mind.177  Brain scans reveal predictable brain activa-
tion for different trademarks (finding common neural activation
across study participants for Campbell’s Soup as ‘sincere,’ Ford as
172. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 5 (citing Gillian Cohen & Dorothy R
Faulkner, Memory for Proper Names: Age Differences in Retrieval 4 BRIT. J. DE-
VELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 187 (1986)).
173. Id.
174. Yu-Ping Chen et al., From “Where” to “What”: Distributed Representa-
tions of Brand Associations in the Human Brain, 52 J. MKTG RES. 453, 455 (2015)
(reporting results of functional magnetic resonance imaging study that revealed
that each brand showed to participants produced a different neural signature);
Economides, supra note 38, at 537–38. R
175. Economides, supra note 38, at 537. R
176. Chen et al., supra note 174, at 456–61 (2015) (reporting results of func- R
tional magnetic resonance imaging study that revealed that each brand showed to
participants produced a different neural signature).
177. Mark Bartholomew, Neuromarks, 103 MINN. L. REV. 521, 524–25 (citing
Chen et al., supra note 174, at 455–58 (testing neural signatures for the COCA- R
COLA, GOOGLE, IBM, and LOUIS-VUITTON trademarks)); Colin Camerer &
Carolyn Yoon, Introduction to the Journal of Marketing Research Special Issue on
Neuroscience and Marketing, 52 J. MKTG. RES. 423, 424 (2015) (“[T]he brands a
consumer is thinking about can be reliably predicted from patterns of neural
activations.”)).
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‘rugged,’ and Mercedes-Benz as ‘sophisticated’).178  Neuroscience
research has also found that brands “with reputations for style or
creativity cause consumers to behave more impulsively.”179
Other research points to semantic and lexical heuristics, under
which consumers link developing associations and create connec-
tions across different brands through meaning, spelling, and other
orthographic characteristics.180  The associative network theory
posits that “consumers organize information in networks that re-
present both semantic (e.g., Maid-Servant) and lexical (phonemic
and orthographic similarities) relationships (e.g., Maid-Made).”181
Consumers use a semantic heuristic to make semantic connections
when they have a higher level of task involvement (i.e., thoughtful
and intentional) in learning about the trademark.182  Conversely,
consumers use a lexical heuristic to make lexical connection when
they have had a lower level of task involvement.183  Accordingly,
one study found that consumers semantically linked the hypotheti-
cal trademark NESTELLO to the existing trademark KIT KAT in
high involvement conditions, but lexically linked NESTELLO to
NESCAFE in low involvement conditions.184  Another study found
that presenting two words—the target (e.g., “rod”) and the homo-
nym of a synonym (“poll”)—forced the participants to think of the
synonym (“pole”), suggesting a strategy for creating brand associa-
tions (perhaps by launching the trademark CARES to create an as-
sociation with the homonym of the synonym LUVS).185  In another
study, consumers noted structural regularities of trademarks within
a category, for example, a study showed that consumers identified
common spellings, number of syllables, and roots for trademarks
178. Id. (citing Chen, supra note 176, at 455–58).  Other studies complement R
these neuroscientific assessments of brand personality by looking for response la-
tencies arising from pairing brands with positive and negative words. See, e.g.,
Claudiu V. Dimofte, Implicit Measures of Consumer Cognition: A Review, 27
PSYCHOL. & MKTG. 921, 925–28 (2010).
179. Bartholomew, supra note 177, at 538. R
180. See Judith Hennessey et al., Lexical Interference in Semantic Processing
of Simple Words: Implications for Brand Names, 22 PSYCHOL. & MKTG. 51, 64
(2005).
181. Lei & Dawar, supra note 106, at 992 (citing Allan Collins & Elizabeth R
Loftus, A Spreading-Activation Theory of Semantic Processing, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL.
407, 411–13 (1975); Hennessey et al., supra note 180, at 55). R
182. Id. at 993.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Hennessey et al., supra note 180, at 63. Of course, adopting a trademark R
with a similar meaning to an existing, a famous mark used in connection with the
same products would likely amount to infringement.
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used in connection with pain killers and laundry detergents,
respectively.186
While these studies demonstrate that consumers make connec-
tions between brands, the defining heuristic of trademarks—the dif-
ferentiation heuristic—focuses on differences rather than
similarities.  Cognitive psychology highlights differentiation as a
hallmark of trademarks.187  Using the vocabulary of semiotics, dif-
ferentiation enables consumers to select one specific product out of
multiple options in the category because each trademark identifies
one referent (the particular product) and one signified (the
source).188  Law professor Barton Beebe explains further how the
semiological concept of differentiation applies to trademarks:
In [Jean] Baudrillard’s social-semiotic theory, sign value de-
scribes a commodity’s differential value as against all other com-
modities, and thus the commodity’s capacity to differentiate its
consumer.  Sign value does not necessarily involve the conspicu-
ous display of prestige or wealth or of scarce ‘positional goods.’
Rather, it involves something more essential:  the conspicuous
display of distinctions, of ‘marginal differences,’ of which there
would appear to be an inexhaustible and easily renewable
supply.189
From an economic perspective, “‘differential distinctiveness’ is used
to alter how the consumer perceives a particular trademark com-
pared with others and thus produces differentiation in the economic
sense.”190
The degree of differentiation builds strength in the mark.
Beebe observes that no matter the message,
each [mark] conveys its message, its signification, by means of its
distinctiveness as against other marks.  It is marketing orthodoxy
that a trademark’s most important quality is not the “esteem” in
which it is held by consumers or its “relevance” to the lives of
consumers, nor is it the “knowledge” consumers have of what the
186. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 27. R
187. Id. at 22 (“Apple Macintosh . . . does not categorise itself as a computer
company[ ] but does differentiate itself from other computer companies.”).
188. Cf. Economides, supra note 38, at 526 (“[T]rademarks permit consumers R
to distinguish between goods which look identical in all features that are observa-
ble before purchase.”).
189. Beebe, supra note 36, at 643 (citing FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO R
GROWTH 27 (1976); and then citing JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE CONSUMER SOCI-
ETY: MYTHS AND STRUCTURES 90 (Chris Turner trans., Sage Publ’ns 1998)).
190. Ramello & Silva, supra note 27, at 946 (“The signal created by trademark R
facilitates the emergence of a complementary economic phenomenon, differentia-
tion, which must also be included in the welfare evaluation.”).
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marks stands for.  Rather, strong brands are characterized above
all by “differentiation.”191
Nearly a century ago, Frank Schechter observed that a trade-
mark derives its value from its selling power, which depends “upon
its uniqueness and singularity,” and that the strength of the brand
depends on standing out as “actually unique and different from
other marks.”192  In marketing language, the terms “salience” and
“brand awareness” equate to this trademark concept of strength, or
the “ability to take on a character of uniqueness in the eyes of con-
sumers.”193  These heuristics also ladder up to the first element of
the anonymity heuristic.  By focusing on the differentiating role of
trademarks, this scholarship illustrates how consumers look to dif-
ferentiation of source, rather than knowledge or identification of
source, to make their purchasing decisions.
Since consumers focus on differentiation, they will discount
any perceived connection between a pseudo-surname trademark
and an actual person.  For instance, in a linguistic study of Russian
company names that included a borrowed European etiquette word
(such as “Herr, Frau, Madame, Monsieur, Mister, Mrs, Miss”) and a
term mimicking a surname, most of the company names had no re-
lation with the surnames of the owners.194  The use of the etiquette
word made the consumer perceive of the company name as a
proper name (though not necessarily a personal name).195  But be-
cause the term following the etiquette word could come from multi-
ple different sources, including “real proper names, neologisms,
borrowings and native words (both proper and common nouns) . . .
the nuclear category of proper names becomes ‘blurred’ and loses
its boundaries.”196
This study provides evidence for the second element of the an-
onymity heuristic as it shows that consumers ignore any surname
interpretations when they process trademarks.  Consistent with the
categorization of surname trademarks as arbitrary marks, consum-
ers thus evaluate surname trademarks through the differentiating
191. Beebe, supra note 36, at 644 (citing DAVID A. AAKER, BUILDING R
STRONG BRANDS 304 (1996)).
192. Schechter, supra note 75, at 831. R
193. Ramello & Silva, supra note 27, at 946. R
194. Sergey Goryaev & Olga Olshvang, Company Names as Imitations of Per-
sonal Names: Models with a Borrowed Etiquette Word, in ONOMASTICS IN CON-
TEMPORARY PUBLIC SPACE 131, 135–46 (Oliviu Felecan & Alina Bughesiu, eds.,
2013).
195. Id. at 146.
196. Id.
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ability of the trademarks rather than through any other interpreta-
tions of the homograph.
D. Consumers Understand Trademarks Within a Cultural
Framework
While a trademark has only one signified—one particular
source and the attendant goodwill—consumers will engage with
that signified in a multiplicity of personal ways based on their back-
grounds and their own diverse and individual experiences with that
trademark.  Consumers examine trademarks through heuristics that
reflect their cultural background deriving from shared language and
experiences.197  Cultural background defines how people process
words (as well as images and sounds).198  Neural research indicates
that people from a shared cultural background exhibit the same
brain activity when they see culturally familiar logos under a heuris-
tic I name the sight and sound value heuristic.199  “For example,
when German test subjects were presented with different luxury car
logos (e.g., BMW vs. Acura), a particular region of the prefrontal
cortex was activated only by the culturally familiar logos.”200  An-
thropologists have found that each culture also develops its own set
of sound symbolism for particular combinations of vowels, conso-
nants, pitch, rhythm, and intonation even when heard outside the
context of particular words.201  As these sound associations develop
in and through discourse, distinct sound symbolisms will arise in
each cultural setting.202
Under the availability heuristic as described by economist
Richard Thaler, people will interpret a word based on homographs
or similar words that they have encountered within their cultural
background.203  As Ferdinand de Saussure, a founder of the field of
semiotics, observed in a seminal work, “the value of any given word
is determined by what other words there are in that particular area
of the vocabulary. . . . No word has a value that can be identified
197. Wong, supra note 89, at 39 (2014) (citing Penelope Eckert, Variation and R
the Indexical Field, 12 J. OF SOCIOLINGUISTICS 453 (2008)).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Bartholomew, supra note 177, at 538 (citing Michael Schaefer et al., Neu- R
ral Correlates of Culturally Familiar Brands of Car Manufacturers, 31
NEUROIMAGE 861, 863–64 (2006)).
201. Wong, supra note 89, at 39. R
202. Id.
203. RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS 22–23 (2015) (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128 (1974)).
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independently of what else there is in the vicinity.”204  And the
value of one word can change solely because of a change to a neigh-
boring term in the same area of vocabulary.205  People may not
know what to make of a term that is familiar in a foreign cultural
setting but obscure or unknown in their normal discourse.  For ex-
ample, Thaler notes that Indians would recognize the term “Dhruv”
as a common surname, but its infrequency outside of India would
make it less likely for non-Indians to recognize the surname func-
tion of the term (or regard the term as anything other than a coined
term).206
Academics across multiple fields argue that trademarks take
on new lives as consumers engage with them more, forming devel-
oping associations for the trademarks, a concept I name the con-
sumer engagement heuristic.  Cultural anthropology scholarship
points out that while culture and the shared experiences of consum-
ers shape how they will first encounter a trademark, that trademark
becomes part of the shared experience, feeding back into the com-
mon cultural backdrop through which consumers experience the
world.207  Economists Giovanni Ramello and Francesco Silva ob-
serve that once a trademark becomes established consumers cannot
describe or access its significance:
Through some straightforward procedure like looking up a tele-
phone number. Rather, it is only decipherable within the context
of a language, meaning a system of social belonging—it is a
thread in the cultural tapestry. Each sign has a meaning that be-
longs to a system of meanings, and this implies the possibility of
detecting and judging differences between brands, which is the
source of the strength of brands.208
Anthropologist Adam Arvidsson describes brands as “mecha-
nisms that enable a direct valorization (in the form of share prices,
for example) of people’s ability to create trust, affect and shared
meanings:  their ability to create something in common.”209  Arvid-
sson continues to argue that “consumer goods function as ‘linking
devices’ that enable the crystallization of however transitory (or
204. FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 114
(Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye eds., Roy Harris trans., Open Court 1983)
(1916).
205. Id. at 120.
206. THALER, supra note 203, at 22. R
207. Cf. Adam Arvidsson, Brands: A Critical Perspective, 5 J. OF CONSUMER
CULTURE 235, 235–36 (2005).
208. Ramello & Silva, supra note 27, at 952 (citations omitted). R
209. Arvidsson, supra note 207, at 235–36. R
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even ‘neo-tribal’) forms of community. In short, consumption pro-
duces a common in the form of a community, a shared identity or
even a short lived ‘experience’ that adds dimensions of use-value to
the object.”210
Additionally, contemporary consumers “produce a social rela-
tion . . . within which goods can make sense; they produce a context
of consumption that a post-modern, highly mediatized lifeworld no
longer self-evidently provides . . . within which goods can acquire
meaning and use-value.”211
Consumers, therefore, help to define the interpretation of
trademarks based on how they use the referent goods or services
and otherwise interact with the brand.  Arvidsson argues that
“modern consumers should not be understood as the passive vic-
tims of producer interests, but that they have actively engaged in
the social construction of the value of consumer goods.”212  Fellow
anthropologist Robert Foster likewise argues that
in its ideal form, then, the economy of qualities entails a fit be-
tween qualifications on the supply side and qualifications on the
demand side-a fit that needs constant monitoring and adjust-
ment, but nonetheless a more or less stable fit. Such stable fits
allow consumers, much like Marx’s figure of homofaber, to con-
template themselves in a product that reflects their own singular
qualities.213
Foster continues, “the creativity and agency of consumers is always
productive of new meanings, relations and affect . . . .”214  Law pro-
fessor Laura Heymann concurs that “to ignore the fact that each
consumer will engage with a trademark in his or her own way—
regardless of what trademark law deems legally cognizable—is to
ignore the realities of the market with which trademark law is sup-
posed to engage.”215
This scholarship suggests that consumers evaluate trademarks
within a culturally specific context and based on the values that
they come to associate with the marks as a result of their exper-
iences with the mark, and not based on some known source of the
goods or services bearing the marks.  These observations about the
210. Id. at 242 (citations omitted).
211. Id. at 241–42 (citations omitted).
212. Id. at 242.
213. Robert J. Foster, The Work of the New Economy: Consumers, Brands,
and Value Creation, 22 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 707, 714 (2007).
214. Id. at 719.
215. Laura A. Heymann, The Reasonable Person in Trademark Law, 52 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 781, 782 (2008).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-2\DIK202.txt unknown Seq: 43 28-JAN-20 14:56
2020] THE ANONYMITY HEURISTIC 361
cultural framework for processing trademarks give evidence to the
first component of the anonymity heuristic in that consumers view
trademarks as identifiers of an unknown, anonymous source that
comes to have its own identity and values within a cultural conver-
sation.  These observations also support categorization of surname
trademarks as arbitrary marks since the cultural conversation sur-
rounding these marks imparts them with new values apart from any
sense or function that the homographs had in their pre- or extra-
trademark lives.
E. People Process Surnames and Trademarks Through Separate
Nodes
The literature supports two possible alternative models for the
processing of surname trademarks.  First, assuming arguendo that
the trademark node connects to a central node that routes to all
interpretations of the homograph, the consumer still processes the
trademark through its own node.  Taking the word “Bush” as an
example under this model, the consumer would process “George
Bush” in one node, “Kate Bush” in a second node, and the BUSH
trademark for cabinets in a third node (See Fig. 1.).  The consumer
does not process the BUSH trademark through a node associated
with a particular person, but instead mediated through a general
“Bush” node.  Accordingly, while the consumer might understand
the surname trademark as having some connection to a surname
due to the shared homograph, she would not believe that the trade-
mark identified any of the known people with the surname as the
source of the goods.  The consumer could distinguish the personal
from the trademark referents and would not treat them as one and
the same.  In other words, the consumer would not think that Kate
Bush or George Bush had any involvement with the BUSH
trademark.
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But the research on surname processing does not mandate a
model where a central homograph node mediates processing of a
surname trademark.  Under a second alternative model of process-
ing, the BUSH trademark would occupy its own node unconnected
to the node for the “Bush” surname node or otherwise for the
“Bush” homograph.  People process the names of each individual
with the surname “Bush” through their own separate nodes con-
nected to the central “Bush” surname node, but the word “bush” as
a shrub directly through its own unconnected node, and the BUSH
cabinets trademark directly through its own node (See Fig. 2.).













In this model people do not have a central node into which every
interpretation of the word “bush” gets collected and then routed to
the node triggered by the particular usage.  Instead, each interpre-
tation of the word “bush” (e.g., common name, trademark) runs
through its own neural pathway.
The multi-disciplinary research supports the model of process-
ing illustrated in Figure 2, with the studies showing that people dis-
ambiguate the various interpretations of homographs with each
interpretation occupying a separate node and accessed through its
own pathway.216  The existence of multiple interpretations of the
homograph does not cause confusion as people can simultaneously
access multiple interpretations of a homograph—including a sur-
name and a common-noun interpretation.217  “Homonymous words
216. See discussion supra in Sections VI.A.
217. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 71 (citing Michael K. Tanehaus et al., R
Evidence for Multiple Stages in the Processing of Ambiguous Words in Syntactic
Contexts, 18 J. OF VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 427, 435–36 (1979); then
citing William Onifer, W. & David A. Swinney, Accessing Lexical Ambiguities
During Sentence Comprehension: Effects of Frequency of Meaning and Contextual
Bias, 9 MEMORY & COGNITION 225, 226–27 (1981); then citing Seidenberg et al.,
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are thus stored as different entries and accessed separately in the
mental lexicon.”218  Access to each node follows a different time-
course and depends on the context and frequency specific to that
interpretation.219  Yet both “operate at the lexical level, rather than
only at that of central encyclopaedic knowledge . . . . [T]hese mech-
anisms may be better understood as types of information-collecting
nodes and pointers of different sorts.”220  The trademark node will
trigger processing through a cultural conversation, context, sound
symbolism, lexical and semantic associations, and differentiation
from other trademarks, not through connections to a person bear-
ing the surname.221  The different associations for the referent of the
BUSH trademark and the referent of a Bush surname would make
it jarring for consumers to try to force connections between these
unrelated functions of the homograph merely because they share
orthography.
Even with their differences, both models illustrate neural
processing consistent with the anonymity heuristic, as the trademark
interpretation occupies its own node representing the unknown
source of the goods and the attendant goodwill.  The node identifies
a particular, but anonymous signified source of goods, unconnected
to any neural pathways that would link that signified with a particu-
lar person who bears the homograph as a surname.  Accordingly,
consumers will process surname trademarks as arbitrary marks with
none of the entailments of the surname interpretation of the
homograph.
IV. IMPACTS OF FREQUENCY AND UNIQUENESS
Under the anonymity heuristic, consumers will view most sur-
name trademarks as source indicators, but not as identifying a per-
son with the respective surname as the source.  While this heuristic
applies most of the time, the familiarity of the surname trademark
homograph may interfere with or alter the heuristic.  Familiarity
has an impact in surname trademark processing in two contexts:  (1)
familiarity with the goods and (2) familiarity with the surname.  In
the first context, purchasing frequency impacts the strength of the
supra note 88, at 494; and then citing Greg B. Simpson and Merilee A. Krueger, R
Selective Access of Homograph Meanings in Sentence Context, 30 J. OF MEMORY &
LANGUAGE 627, 628 (1991)).
218. Jake Linford, The False Dichotomy Between Suggestive and Descriptive
Trademarks, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367, 1399–1400 (2015).
219. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 71. R
220. Neuropsychology of Proper Names, supra note 35, at 348 (citing WILLEM R
J.M. LEVELT, SPEAKING: FROM INTENTION TO ARTICULATION 6 (1989)).
221. See discussion supra in Sections VI.C. and D.
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developing associations that consumers form with the mark, which,
as the purchases multiply, may result in a weaker distinction be-
tween the surname and trademark functions.  In the second context,
consumers may infer or recognize connections between a known
(particularly a unique known) surname and the goods and services
offered under that homograph as a trademark, such as when the
consumers personally know the person providing those services (as
with an accountant or landscaper).
The first context—familiarity with the goods—arises when a
consumer’s purchasing patterns make it less likely for them to en-
counter certain goods.  Consumers will treat trademarks for com-
monly used (“experience”) goods differently from trademarks for
infrequently used goods.222  For experience goods, the consumer
can draw from a deeper well of personal experience with products
in a category.223  But for infrequently used goods, “because of dif-
ferences of interpretation as well as differences of opinion and pref-
erence across consumers, the information on which the choice will
be based is most likely to be much more vague than in the case of
experience goods.”224  Accordingly, for these goods, “trademarks
work in an indirect way.  To be able to associate the trademark with
the features of the product he has to rely on information diffused
informally through friends or from evaluations disseminated cen-
trally through magazines, radio or television.”225  A consumer of
rarely purchased goods will have less information about the trade-
mark and the brand values it conveys.226  As economist Richard
Thaler observed, “Because learning takes practice, we are more
likely to get things right at small stakes than at large stakes.”227
All trademarks, including surname trademarks, take on their
developing associations through the familiarity that accrues as con-
sumers purchase the associated goods or services or hear about the
marks.228  Having limited interactions with trademarks used for
222. See Economides, supra note 38, at 531. R
223. See id. at 529–30.
224. Id. at 531.
225. Id.
226. See id.  The level of information will depend on other factors as well.
Consumers tend to make more sophisticated purchasing decisions for higher
priced goods or those that will make a larger impact in life.  Primrose Ret. Cmtys.,
LLC v. Edward Rose Senior Living, LLC, 122 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030, 1038–39
(T.T.A.B. 2016) (finding that, “even in the case of the least sophisticated pur-
chaser, a decision as important as choosing a senior living community will be made
with some thought and research, even when made hastily”).
227. Thaler, supra note 203, at 50. R
228. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 21 (citing S.A. Tarkhov, From Karlo- R
Libknekhtovsk and New York to Propoysk and Rastyapino? How Place Names Are
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rarely purchased goods will lead consumers to form only weak de-
veloping associations, which might allow prior associations, includ-
ing surname functions, to linger.  Nonetheless, any such associations
will likely have little impact on consumer purchasing decisions,
since consumers rarely purchase these goods and thus will not form
any lasting set of associations for the trademark.  Further, as dis-
cussed supra in Section IV.A., the context of presentation of the
word will define its function as a trademark, so that consumers will
not believe that the term functions as a surname or has a one-to-
one relationship with a person bearing that name as the source.229
The impact of purchasing frequency remains limited to the strength
of the developing associations and does not replace the anonymity
heuristic.
The second context—familiarity with the surname—arises
when consumers recognize a connection between an individual
bearing the surname and the goods or services offered under the
trademark.  This plays out in two ways—a proprietor known per-
sonally by the consumer or a famous person with a unique name
who stands behind the product.  In the first scenario, the proprietor
opens an eponymous business and has direct contact with custom-
ers, such as with a dentist office, a law firm, or a landscaping busi-
ness.  The customers know the proprietor by name, know that the
business bears the proprietor’s name, and, accordingly, draw the
connection between the business name and the surname.  These sit-
uations would most likely happen with small, hyper-local service
businesses since they require a direct relationship between the pro-
prietor and the customers.  This model traces back to the roots of
trademarks in mercantile capitalism when the tradesperson’s name
signaled the origin and quality of the goods bearing that name as a
trademark.230  Perhaps in this situation the trademark interpreta-
tion maintains some of the prior associations of the surname func-
tion.  The strength of the prior associations may depend on how
well consumers know the proprietor and whether they interact di-
rectly with him or her.  If the proprietor remains an anonymous
Changing in the Former USSR, 33 POST-SOVIET GEOGRAPHY 454, 454–55 (1992);
and then citing David C. Rubin et al., The Abstraction of Form in Semantic Catego-
ries, 19 MEMORY & COGNITION 1, 5–6 (1991)).
229. Accord Heymann, supra note 34, at 398 (“More generally, it is context R
that indicates whether an unknown term is functioning as a trademark or name in
some other way.  A consumer who has never before encountered the word ‘Zazy’
will likely assume, when she sees it on the front of a box of cereal in stylized script,
that the word is functioning as a trademark.”); see also Lee et al., supra note 104, at
1098–99 (2009).
230. Manning, supra note 63, at 37; see also Surname Imitation, supra note 64, R
at 155.
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figure in a closed office, then the consumers would process the sur-
name trademark free of prior associations.
The second scenario involving familiarity with the surname
arises within the context of surname uniqueness in population and
prominence through famous individuals.  Consumers will recognize
certain terms as surnames because of either a famous individual
with that surname or because of a high volume of individuals with
the surname.  Cognitive psychology scholarship has observed the
“ubiquitous effects of word frequency reported in the word recogni-
tion literature.”231  “The number of times a name is encountered
will depend on the frequency of the name and the degree of famili-
arity of known people who have that name.”232  Studies show that
people will more quickly recall familiar surnames whether the fa-
miliarity derives from one highly famous individual or a common
surname held by many individuals.233  The word “Moore” demon-
strates both high frequency and high familiarity; the large number
of individuals with that name as well as the prominence of multiple
celebrities with the surname (Dudley Moore, Demi Moore, Roger
Moore) will make it more recognizable as a surname.234
Subjects in psychological studies could more quickly classify
high frequency surnames than low frequency surnames.235  Like-
wise, cognitive psychological research indicates that people can
name common surnames faster than rare surnames and more accu-
rately recognize them.236  Thus, in general, people can more easily
recall the surname “Baker” than the surname “Ryman” (assuming
no famous person with the name Ryman).237  Nonetheless, people
231. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 56 (citing Tim Valentine & André Fer- R
rara, Typicality in Categorization, Recognition and Identification: Evidence from
Face Recognition, 82 BRIT. J. OF PSYCHOL. 87, 100 (1991); and then citing Don L.
Scarborough et al., Frequency and Repetition Effects in Lexical Memory, 3 J. OF
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 1, 15–16 (1977)).
232. Id. at 58.
233. Id. at 62. The authors note:
The results indicate that it does not make any difference whether the
source of the perceived familiarity of a surname arises because it is the
name of one highly familiar individual, or because it is a common sur-
name and has been encountered in a connection with many individuals.
So long as it has been encountered frequently in the past, subjects are
able to rapidly classify the name according to its national origin.
Id.
234. Id. at 58.
235. Id. at 62.
236. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 74; Neuropsychology of Proper Names, R
supra note 35, at 360–61 (citing Clark Ohnesorge & Diana Van Lancker, Cerebral R
Laterality for Famous Proper Nouns: Visual Recognition by Normal Subjects, 77
BRAIN & LANGUAGE 135, 150–51 (2001)).
237. Plausible Phonology, supra note 125, at 411–12. R
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have an even easier time with unique famous names compared to
common famous names.  One study found that “[t]he mean [re-
sponse time] to correctly accept as familiar the initial and surname
of celebrities with high frequency surnames was slower than the
mean [response time] to famous low frequency surnames.”238  For
example, study participants recognized “M. Jagger” more quickly
than “M. Jackson,” for despite the high level of fame for both Mick
Jagger and Michael Jackson, Jagger has a more unique surname.239
Likewise, any recognition of the name “Kierkegaard” will likely
point to the philosopher, while the name “Cooper” may trigger
thoughts of multiple famous people named “Cooper” but also non-
famous people named “Cooper.”240  Cognitive psychologists ex-
plain this result by pointing out that each famous unique name oc-
cupies its own node, while famous common names will occupy
multiple nodes—one for each individual with the name.241  Accord-
ingly, the famous unique name will activate only one node, while
people will have to discern among the multiple modes activated si-
multaneously by the famous common name, resulting in a process-
ing delay.242
The research on familiarity and frequency suggests that we can
divide surname trademarks into three broad categories:  famous
unique surnames, well-known common surnames, and little-known
rare surnames.  Famous unique surnames, like Kierkegaard, iden-
tify one referent—the well-known individual.  Transforming that let-
ter string into a trademark might endow that surname trademark
with the same associations the consumer already has made for that
particular individual.  However, this would probably only happen
with the names of living individuals since endorsements from be-
yond the grave likely have little effect on most consumers, who
would not presume that the deceased individual had personally
manufactured or approved the underlying goods.  Endorsements by
238. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 65 (emphasis in original). R
239. Id.
240. Paul Muter, Recognition and Recall of Words with a Single Meaning, 10
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.:  LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 198, 202 (1984).
241. Id. at 201. Muter comments that
[i]n recall, a subset of all nodes is accessed and examined, and those that
bear the relevant information are output.  For a common name, it is pos-
sible that a nonfamous node will be accessed at the time of the recogni-
tion test and a famous node will be accessed at the time of the recall test.
If this happens, recognition failure of a recallable word occurs.  For a
unique name, on the other hand, the number of nodes in memory would
be at most one.
Id.; see also BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 65. R
242. BEING ERNEST, supra note 31, at 81–82. R
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the celebrity would strengthen the connection between the trade-
mark and surname uses.  Consumers would not use the anonymity
heuristic to process this narrow set of surname trademarks.
Well-known common surnames, like Cooper, do not have a
unique referent.  Each surname term occupies multiple nodes for
each of the individuals bearing the surname and consumers would
simply add another node for a trademark interpretation, uncon-
nected to the nodes for each of the individuals.  Any surname en-
tailments or prior associations quickly fade.  Consumers would
process the trademark using the anonymity heuristic.
For the final category—little-known surnames—consumers
would have had little exposure to them as surnames.  Thus, when
these words become a homograph with a trademark function, con-
sumers would consider the surname trademark an arbitrary or
coined term.  These terms have no prior associations.  Consumers
would not have created a node for the surname interpretation of
the homograph since they would have had no exposure to its use in
this context.  Instead, consumers would create a trademark node
and any encounters with the homograph would trigger only that
node, at least until they encountered someone with the surname.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
As discussed in this Article, a reading of the multi-disciplinary,
extra-legal scholarship supports the proposition that consumers will
recognize the trademark function of surname trademarks and will
not regard them as surnames.  Further, consumers utilizing the ano-
nymity heuristic to process trademarks will rarely associate a sur-
name trademark with any particular individual.  Recognizing this
about consumer behavior, what conclusions can we draw about
§ 2(e)(4)—does it strikes the proper balance between protecting
trademark rights and allowing people to use their own surnames in
connection with their businesses?  Perhaps trademark law could
better support both these interests without § 2(e)(4) by relying in-
stead on:  (1) existing prohibitions against false associations in the
Lanham Act; (2) the current requirement that registrants assert that
they have exclusive rights in the trademark, yet subject to certain
limitations; and (3) those limitations, namely the existing provisions
for concurrent and pre-existing rights, and a new own-name
defense.
Rescinding § 2(e)(4) would align the law with the realities of
consumer behavior discussed in this Article.  The scholarship
reveals that in most scenarios, consumers who encounter trade-
marks classified under the law as primarily “merely surnames” do
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not actually perceive them as surnames.243  While consumers may
initially process an unfamiliar trademark by relying on prior as-
sociations for the homograph, consumers need only a handful of
encounters to develop a separate trademark node for the homo-
graph.244  As consumers will process the surname trademark as a
trademark almost immediately, it follows that the law should allow
for registration of surname trademarks upon use.245  Yet, U.S.
trademark law generally requires five years of substantially exclu-
sive and continuous use of the mark to establish that the mark has
acquired distinctiveness under § 2(f).246  Allowing registration of
surname trademarks once use commences would better align with
consumer behavior as the word will become a trademark when con-
sumers start seeing it as a trademark.247
The current requirement of waiting five years to register a sur-
name trademark has real and negative impacts on the brand owner.
During those five years, a competitor may begin using the same
surname trademark, either innocently or with the intention of capi-
talizing on the goodwill of the senior user.  In either case the emer-
gence of this competitive, junior use of the surname trademark
disrupts the business of the senior brand owner.  If the competitor
innocently adopted the mark in a geographically remote part of the
country the senior user will have few legal remedies against it and
that competitor’s use will prevent the senior user from expanding
its business into that area.  While the brand owner could try to
knock out the competitor’s use through an unfair competition
claim, those claims require proof of reputation in the trading area
of the junior user and that the junior user knew of the senior use,
making those claims difficult and expensive to win.248  Securing a
243. See supra Section IV and notes therein.
244. See supra Section IV.A. and notes therein.
245. See Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f)
(2018); supra Section IV and notes therein.
246. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f);
TRADEMARK MANUAL, supra note 15, § 1212.05. R
247. While the Lanham Act generally requires use of a mark as a precondi-
tion to registration, two sections permit registration without use.  Sections 44 and
66(a) allow for U.S. registrations based on a registration in the registrant’s home
country, each through a different mechanism.  Lanham Act §§ 44, 66(a), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1126, 1141f(a).
248. Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 780 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is well-es-
tablished that the scope of protection accorded his mark is coextensive only with
the territory throughout which it is known and from which it has drawn its trade.”
(citing Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 416 (1916))); see also
Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 674 (7th Cir. 1982) (“A good
faith junior user is one who begins using a mark with no knowledge that someone
else is already using it.”).
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nationwide registration for the surname trademark early in the life
of the trademark offers a much more attractive option in term of
both expense and convenience.  And even if elimination of
§ 2(e)(4) ends up removing more surname trademarks from the
public domain, proprietors can choose a trademark from a nearly
unlimited universe of potential marks.249
Additionally, equity issues in the current § 2(e)(4) framework
provide further grounds for eliminating the prohibition against
trademark registration of terms deemed primarily merely surnames.
The equity issues arise from the subjective nature of determining
whether consumers will regard a term as primarily merely a sur-
name.  In practice, the USPTO recognizes White surnames more
often than non-White surnames, longer surnames more than
shorter surnames, and more common surnames more than rarer
surnames.250  As I have argued elsewhere, this unfairly disadvan-
tages those with non-White, shorter, or rarer surnames, who find
their names captured under exclusive rights by companies without
any connection to the name, while others can freely use their
names.251  Allowing trademark registration of all surname trade-
marks once use commences would remedy this inequity, and other
statutory provisions could safeguard against unfair uses of trade-
mark surnames.252
Those statutory provisions include protections against inequi-
table or deceptive uses of surname trademarks.  Section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act prohibits registration of deceptive terms or those that
would falsely suggest a connection:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distin-
guished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on
the principal register on account of its nature unless it—
249. Surname Imitation, supra note 64, at 149.  But see Barton Beebe & R
Jeanne Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An Empirical Study of
Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 947, 987 (2018) (arguing
that trademarks occupy a finite, and shrinking, universe, and concluding that 61.5
percent of the U.S. population already had their surnames registered as
trademarks).
250. Russell W. Jacobs, The Impact of Race, Orthography, and Population on
Trademark Registration of Surnames, 22 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. (forthcoming).
251. Id.
252. Refusing trademark registration of all surnames would likewise resolve
the equity issues but would not align to the observations on consumer behavior
revealed in the multi-disciplinary research presented in this Article.
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(a) Consists of or comprises . . . deceptive . . . matter; or matter
which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with per-
sons, living or dead . . . 253
The USPTO could refuse to register a surname trademark
under § 2(a) if that surname trademark might deceive consumers
into falsely believing that a known person with that surname of-
fered or had endorsed the underlying goods or services.254  That
section not only prohibits deceptive marks, but it also explicitly for-
bids registration of “matter which may . . . falsely suggest a connec-
tion with persons, living or dead,” which would provide an
additional statutory basis for rejecting a surname trademark that
inequitably drew from an unrelated individual’s reputation.255
Moreover, § 2(c) requires consent to registration if the mark con-
sists of the name of a particular living individual.256  Both of these
sections provide protection for someone who had built a business
through blood, sweat, and tears against attempts of a competitor to
lock up a federal registration in that name.257  A celebrity could use
these sections to stop a pirate from registering the celebrity’s sur-
name in an effort to ride on that celebrity’s fame.258  A refusal
253. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2018).
254. See In re White Jasmine LLC, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1391
(T.T.A.B. 2013) (non-precedential) (“It is well established that a mark may be
found deceptive on the basis of a single deceptive term that is embedded in a
larger mark. . . .”).
255. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
256. Id., § 1052(c).
257. Note that proprietors already use surname trademarks even if no one
associated with the proprietor bears the name, including through purchase of a
business and the associated trademark from someone bearing that name.  Hey-
mann, supra note 34, at 438.  Professor Heymann notes: R
Likewise, the use of the same name in different contexts is not necessarily
impermissible, provided that those names are fulfilling different denota-
tive functions.  For example, an individual who has started a business
under his or her name might sell that business, including the name-as-
trademark, to another firm.  The individual would then be prohibited
from using his or her name as a mark if that use would be likely to con-
fuse consumers as to the source of his or her goods or services, but he or
she would not be restricted from using his or her name as a personal
name (that is, to refer to the individual rather than to the former
business).
Id. (citing Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Goldwyn, 296 F. 391, 397 (2d Cir. 1924) (“We
have no doubt that one by contract may deprive himself of his exclusive right to
use his name in industry.”)).
258. In re Sloppy Joe’s Int’l Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1350, 1353–54 (T.T.A.B. 1997)
(not citable as precedent) (finding that friendship with Ernest Hemingway did not
establish sufficient connection to entitle applicant to obtain registration for mark
including portrait of the author).
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under § 2(a) does not require a finding of intent to trade on the
celebrity’s goodwill.259
Further, trademark registrations only issue in the United States
if the applicant has exclusive rights in the trademarks.  Applicants
must declare under penalty of perjury that they do not know of
anyone else with rights in the mark.  The declaration in the trade-
mark application reads as follows:
To the best of the signatory’s knowledge and belief, no other per-
son, except, if applicable, concurrent users, have the right to use
the mark in commerce, either in the identical form or in such
near resemblance as to be likely, when used on or in connection
with the goods/services of such other person, to cause confusion
of mistake, or to deceive.260
Signing the declaration with knowledge that someone else has
rights in the mark constitutes fraud and would render any resulting
registration void ab initio.261  To register a surname trademark, an
applicant therefore should not seek to register the mark if it knows
of others using the same surname in connection with the same
goods or services.  An individual operating a business under his or
her own surname could use fraud as a basis to oppose or cancel a
registration of the same surname as a trademark filed with knowl-
edge that someone else had prior use of the surname trademark,
and thus protect its own ability to continue to use his or her own
name.  Of course, this puts the onus on the proprietor to bring the
legal action rather than relying on the USPTO to protect the sur-
name trademark.
Moreover, even a registration for a surname trademark does
not endow the registrant with an absolute monopoly in the sur-
name.  Under United States trademark law, registration of a trade-
mark does not undo competitors’ already existing rights in their
trademarks.262  Using the mark before the registrant started use will
create sufficient rights to permit continued use of the mark despite
259. S & L Acquisition Co. v. Helene Arpels, Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1221, 1224
(T.T.A.B. 1987).
260. TEAS Plus Trademark Application, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., (Jan.
25, 2017), https://bit.ly/2moQpId [https://perma.cc/8UV8-MDDC].
261. See, e.g., Medinol Ltd. v. Neuro Vasx, Inc., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1205,
1208 (T.T.A.B. 2003) (“If fraud can be shown in the procurement of a registration,
the entire resulting registration is void.” (citing Gen. Car & Truck Leasing Sys.,
Inc. v. Gen. Rent-A-Car Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398, 1401 (S.D. Fla. 1990))).
262. TRADEMARK MANUAL, supra note 15, § 201.02 (“Upon registration, fil- R
ing affords the applicant nationwide priority over others, except:  (1) parties who
used the mark before the applicant’s filing date. . . .”) (citations omitted).
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the issuance of the registration to someone else.263  The Lanham
Act also has a provision under which multiple businesses that use
the same mark in remote geographic areas each can obtain a con-
current use registration which grants exclusive rights, but only in
their respective parts of the country.264  With these provisions, mul-
tiple individuals with the same surname can simultaneously use
their surnames as trademarks, particularly in different cities or
states.  The same surname trademarks can co-exist in an additional
way—through use in connection with unrelated goods or services,
since trademark rights only extend to particular goods or services
and do not provide blanket exclusivity across all sectors.265
To provide additional protections for individuals to use their
surnames in connection with their businesses, United States trade-
mark jurisprudence could incorporate a principle found in the
trademark law of other jurisdictions—the “own-name defense.”
This principle upholds the right of an individual to use his or her
own name as long as the use would not constitute unfair competi-
tion.  The European Union incorporates this principle as a defense
in its Trademark Directive, namely that “[a] Community trade mark
shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third party from using
in the course of trade:  (a) his own name or address . . . provided he
uses them in accordance with honest practices in industrial or com-
mercial matters.”266  The High Court in Bengalaru, India recently
recognized the own-name defense in a case between two members
of the same family who both used their surname “Patil” in their
business names.267  The High Court affirmed the decision by the
District Court against the trademark registrant who had sought to
stop the defendant from using the trademark.268  The Court held
that under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and section
35 of the Indian Trademark Act, “even a registered user or a regis-
263. Id.
264. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2018);
Trademark Manual, supra note 15, § 1207.04(a). R
265. TRADEMARK MANUAL, supra note 15, § 1207.01 (“In the ex parte exami- R
nation of a trademark application, a refusal under §[ ]2(d) is normally based on the
examining attorney’s conclusion that the applicant’s mark, as used on or in connec-
tion with the specified goods or services, so resembles a registered mark as to be
likely to cause confusion.”).
266. Eur. Union Trademark Directive Art. 12(a) (Feb. 20, 2009), https://bit.ly/
2BMgNA7 [https://perma.cc/J6KW-TJY3] (“Limitation of the effects of a Commu-
nity trade[ ]mark.”).
267. Patil v. Patil, (2018) Misc. First App. Of 2018 No. 2707, ¶ 11 (Bengaluru
HC).
268. Id. at ¶ 17.
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tered trademark proprietor cannot interfere with the bona fide use
of a person of his own name or that of his place of business.”269
While the own-name defense could provide some protections
for individuals to use their names in connection with their busi-
nesses it has its limitations.  Individuals have difficulties succeeding
with an own-name defense.  Corporate entities responsible for the
luxury brand Gucci overcame that defense in cases in Italy, Hong
Kong, and the United States against members of the Gucci family
who sought to use the Gucci name in their own marks.  The Italian
court held that use of the surname trademark created an unfair as-
sociation with the fashion house.270  In the U.S., the TTAB did not
expressly consider the own-name defense, but acknowledged the
family relationship when sustaining the opposition to register the
junior user’s mark based on a likelihood of confusion with the
GUCCI mark.271  The Danish Supreme Court recently acknowl-
edged the availability of the own-name defense, but concluded that
it did not apply in a case brought by the “Jensen’s Bøfhus” chain of
steakhouses against the “Jensen Fiskerestaurant” seafood restau-
rant because only one of the defendant’s shareholders and not the
defendant itself had the name “Jensen.”272  Finding the right bal-
ance between individual’s rights in their names and fair competition
will require some adjustments in US trademark jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
The anonymity heuristic reflects the findings in the multi-disci-
plinary literature that consumers treat trademarks as source indica-
tors, but that consumers do not take that source indicating function
literally.  This challenges the traditional legal characterization of
surname trademarks as descriptive, i.e., as identifying the particular
269. Id. at ¶ 11.
270. Lauren Milligan, Gucci Vs Gucci, VOGUE (July 25, 2012), https://bit.ly/
2lEAyoC [https://perma.cc/K42N-43UA].
271. Gucci America, Inc. v. UGP, LLC, 2018 WL 3456009, at *11 (T.T.A.B.
2018) (non-precedential).  The board reasoned:
Given the ‘known’ family connection between Uberto Gucci and the fa-
mous Gucci family, Opposer’s history and fame, the nature of the goods
and similarity of the marks, we find source confusion likely between, at
the very least, Applicant’s mark UBERTO BY GUCCI for electronic cig-
arettes, and Opposer’s marks FLORA BY GUCCI for ‘essential oils for
personal use’ and ‘perfumes’ (Reg. No. 3627729) and GUCCI for pens
and moneyclips (Reg. Nos. 1093769 and 1200991).
Id.
272. Susanne Junker, Jensen’s Bøfhus fortryder navnestrid med fisker-
estaurant, DR (May 6, 2016, 1:14 PM), https://bit.ly/2mkMCM0 [https://perma.cc/
FPP9-6XSU].
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-2\DIK202.txt unknown Seq: 57 28-JAN-20 14:56
2020] THE ANONYMITY HEURISTIC 375
source of the goods.  Instead of identifying a particular person who
made the goods, the trademark signals an unknown brand concept.
Like surnames, trademarks lack sense, so consumers will find no
inherent meaning from trademarks.  The lack of inherent associa-
tions between a surname and a trademark usage of a homograph
indicates that consumers regard surname trademarks as arbitrary
marks.  Exceptions to this heuristic may arise in the narrow circum-
stances where a famous individual with a unique surname offers
goods or services under the linked surname trademark or with a
hyper-local business where the consumer interacts directly with the
proprietor who has converted his or her surname into the trade-
mark for the business.
This research suggests the need for a change to the legal frame-
work for surname trademarks to reflect consumer reality.  Re-
scinding the prohibition against registration of surname trademarks
in § 2(e)(4) while ensuring strong protections against deceptive
marks or terms suggesting a false connection, along with the intro-
duction of an own-name defense, would better align the law to the
realities of human behavior.  Eliminating this section admittedly
would disturb the common-law tradition of keeping surnames avail-
able for use as business names.  But trademark policy must balance
that tradition with the goals of consumer protection.  Protecting ex-
clusive rights in surname trademarks allows consumers to build as-
sociations between the signifier trademark and the signified source
and make purchasing decisions quickly based on his or her impres-
sion of the brand.  Moreover, concurrent use registrations and the
own-name defense would still allow people to operate eponymous
businesses.  Aligning policy to the realities of consumer behavior
would benefit both business owners and consumers.
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